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SUMMARY
During the Cold War the different alignment choices of the Nordic states meant 
that military cooperation among them was highly circumscribed, and security is-
sues were taboo in the Nordic Council. Following the events of 1989–91 Nordic 
defence cooperation intensified, and new institutions were established to facilitate 
joint deployments, acquisitions, research and development. In the late 2000s there 
was another surge in Nordic military cooperation which culminated in the organisa-
tion Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). The main driver was economic: 
the Nordic Armed Forces were facing static or shrinking budgets, rising costs, and a 
demand to take part in new post-Cold War international missions. 
Given similarities in terms of size, culture and geographical proximity, the Nordic 
countries are well placed to form a so-called cluster-group of NATO/EU countries. 
Collaboration on military matters could proceed more readily within such a group 
than would be possible with larger and more heterogeneous organisations. There is, 
however, no shared Nordic view on ‘hard security’ issues in the Nordic region itself, 
which suggests that a joint security and defence regime aiming at something close 
to a Nordic alliance may find it hard to succeed. What NORDEFCO offers is an op-
portunity to get better value from the Nordic defence budgets by doing more joint 
research, acquisitions, education, training and deployments. The Swedish, Norwe-
gian and Danish Armed Forces are quite similar in structure, which should facilitate 
cooperation, but Denmark, for political reasons, has held back. The Finnish Armed 
Forces would be a somewhat more challenging partner, due to the much larger con-
tingent of inactive reserve forces, while Iceland is mostly excluded due to its lack 
of proper armed forces. All the Nordic states will face challenges domestically if 
NORDEFCO advances to the stage at which people need to relocate, changes jobs 
and industrial contracts move out of the country. If the organisation does reach this 
stage, it will require deft distributive bargaining by the Nordic governments.
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Nordic defence  
at a c rossroads
Most armed forces are struggling to address the above average growth in the cost 
of military equipment. This is not a new phenomenon; it’s been around since at 
least the start of the 20th century (Kennedy 1989, 442–443). Kenneth Adelman 
and Norman Augustine have called the phenomenon ‘techflation’. Adopting a zero 
real-growth defence budget, they argue, will not keep the force size static, but lead 
to its decline (Adelman and Augustine 1990, 90–91). A study by the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishments put this gradual increase in unit costs at between 
2 and 6 per cent above inflation. Over the long-term, it maintained, there are only 
three main strategies to compensate for it: reducing the number of units; cutting 
whole military capabilities; and decreasing unit costs by buying ’off the shelf ’ alone 
or in collaboration with others (Kvalvik and Johansen 2008, 4, 51–57). While all 
the above strategies have been employed in various combinations, reducing the 
number of units has been the preferred response.
In parallel with the rising cost of defence equipment, the post-Cold War ‘peace 
dividend’ resulted in western countries allocating shrinking shares of their nation-
al economies to the armed forces, reducing the overall purchasing power of most 
western militaries. The defence expenditures of the European member states of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) decreased from an average of 3.1 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1985–89, to 1.7 per cent in 2007 (NATO 
2009, 6).1 The day-to-day tasks of the western armed forces also changed in these 
years.
During the Cold War most European military forces were homebound, ‘un-
blooded’ armies (Nyholm 1997, 396). However, with the upheavals of 1989–91 
came a new wave of international military intervention, spearheaded by the western 
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transatlantic security community (Mayall 2007). European forces, which during the 
Cold War were intended to ‘fight in place’, needed to transform in order to be capable 
of projecting troops and firepower over great distances (Yost 2000–01, 99–100). 
The challenge of transforming ‘peacetime’ forces into ‘forces in operations’ and ‘in-
place, static forces’ into ‘deployable forces’ proved formidable, and costly, for many 
European armed forces.
The Nordic states have taken part in these general trends in western defence, 
both in defence spending and assigned tasks. To address the challenges facing the 
Nordic states today, they are aiming to cooperate in several areas, including educat-
ing officers, developing and purchasing equipment, soldier training, and force de-
ployment for international military operations globally. Enhancing the level of foreign 
and security policy cooperation among the Nordic countries has also been aired, 
including concrete issues such as patrolling Iceland’s air space and establishing joint 
consular and diplomatic missions.
This study outlines the move to enhance defence cooperation among the Nordic 
states after the Cold War. It seeks to explain why and how the Nordic states sought 
to strengthen their cooperation in the security and defence field, and whether the 
Nordic states are likely to succeed in their ambitious plans. The study will attempt 
to answer the question chiefly by examining the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NOR-
DEFCO) organisation, what it is, does and aims to do, and ask whether or not the 
Nordic states are likely to achieve the goals they set themselves when they created 
this organisation. Each chapter adopts a different perspective on NORDEFCO, dis-
cussing different reasons why the venture may or may not succeed.
Now one might legitimately ask why one should care about the defence efforts 
of the Nordic states. Are they after all not small and relatively peripheral? While it 
is indeed a commonplace to describe the Nordic countries as ‘small states’ – a cat-
egory whose exact definition happens to be hotly disputed nonetheless (Rickli 2008, 
308–311; Maass 2009), – when viewed collectively they are anything but insig-
nificant. Seen together they have a population of about 25 million, spend almost 
$19 billion on defence annually, and have a combined GDP of $1.3 trillion, just 
surpassing Canada and making up the world’s tenth largest economy (IISS 2010, 
127–128, 152, 183–184, 193; International Monetary Fund 2010).
Furthermore, while the Nordic region is generally seen as a cluster of wealthy, 
stable, and highly peaceful states, the Nordic countries have nevertheless, or per-
haps exactly for that reason, aimed to make a disproportional contribution towards 
promoting international peace and security (on the Nordic peace, see Archer and 
Joenniemi 2003). The Nordic states have a long history of providing troops to tra-
ditional United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, accounting for about 25 
per cent of all such troops during the Cold War (Jakobsen 2006, 10–36). Today 
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the Nordic states pay approximately 3 per cent of the UN’s regular peacekeeping 
budget annually through assessed contributions (Johnstone 2007, 172), and their 
voluntary financial contributions make up as much as 40 per cent of the budgets 
of some specialised UN programmes and agencies (Laatikainen 2003, 410). The 
Nordic states give about $15.4 billion annually in development aid and $1.5 billion 
in humanitarian aid, or about 10 per cent of the world’s official government devel-
opment assistance and humanitarian aid (OECD 2008, 6; Global Humanitarian 
Assistance 2010, 21).
Denmark Norway Sweden Finland Iceland
Popul. (million) 5,5 4,6 9 5,2 0,3
Territory (km²) 43,094 323,802 450,295 338,145 103,000
Economy ($bn) 41 452 479 274 16.8
Mil. exp. ($bn) 4.46 5.86 6.06 3.63 0.045
Per cent GDP 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.3
Active troops 26,585 24,025 13,050 22,600 130
TABLE 1: The Nordic countries in comparison3
While they spend generously on foreign aid, relative spending in each of them on 
the armed forces has declined continuously since the Cold War, as in the rest of the 
Euro-Atlantic area. Norwegian and Danish defence expenditure fell from 2.9 and 
2.0 per cent of GDP in the late 1980s, to about 1.3 per cent in 2008. Sweden and 
Finland spent about 3 and 1.5 per cent of their GDP on defence in 1987–88, drop-
ping to 1.3 per cent by 2008 (NATO 2009, 6; IISS 1989, 100).2 As a result, at 
least in Norway and Sweden, the increased growth in costs within the defence sector 
was not entirely compensated for by the budgetary process (Nordlund, Wiklund, and 
Öström 2009, 73; Norwegian Defence Policy Commission 2007, 31). Since costs 
within the defence sector tend to rise at least at the rate of GDP, not least labour 
costs, then even without techflation the Swedish defence sector’s purchasing power 
would had decreased according to an estimate of the Swedish Armed Forces (Swed-
ish Armed Forces Headquarters 2007, 65). In Norway, due to the balance of goods 
and services the Norwegian Armed Forces purchase, the overall average growth in 
the price of goods and services exceeded that of the general economy (Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence 2001, 123–124).
The cumulative effect of these factors is dramatic. A study by the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment estimated the effect of ‘techflation’ and above-
average general growth in, e.g. labour costs in the defence sector, and suggested 
that the purchasing power of the Norwegian Armed Forces could have fallen by as 
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much as 40 per cent in the period 1990–2005 (Tore Vamraak and Berg-Knutsen 
2006, 23). In any case, full compensation would perhaps have been unlikely, given 
the widely held view that most western states could afford a ‘peace dividend’ after 
the Cold War.
Techflation and static budgets were not the only challenges the Nordic states 
had to deal with. They were being faced with demanding and sometimes costly new 
post-Cold War tasks as well. In 1989, the Nordic peacetime structures were basi-
cally a training establishment, where officers were trainers and managers ‘producing’ 
conscripted soldiers who, after military service, joined the reserve forces which made 
up the bulk of the armed forces. UN peacekeeping was the closest soldiers came 
to combat (Frantzen 2005, 153; Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes 2004, 67–68). 
In 2010, the majority of the active Nordic forces were much better trained and 
equipped. Some had standing units manned by professional soldiers, and many 
were regularly deployed on demanding and sometimes dangerous missions overseas 
alongside their allies and partners.
The present number of Nordic troops deployed abroad is not exceptionally high 
historically. In fact, all the Nordic countries except Denmark had as many or more 
troops abroad in 1989 than in 2010 (IISS 1989, 69, 84, 98, 101). However, con-
temporary tasks are, as we have seen, much more demanding, and therefore much 
more costly, unlike traditional UN peacekeeping based on consent, impartiality and 
minimum use of force (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004, 93–165). At the start 
of 2010 the Nordic states had almost 3,000 soldiers involved in international mili-
tary operations. The bulk of these troops were in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Chad 
(IISS 2010, 127–128, 152, 183–184, 193).
This number is unlikely to fall anytime soon, since the Nordic states are all com-
mitted to maintaining their contribution to international security and participating in 
military operations undertaken by the UN, NATO, the European Union (EU), other 
international security organisations, and sometimes in ad hoc coalitions of willing 
states. Such participation is now therefore identified as a key task for the armed 
forces in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Both Denmark and Sweden aim to be able to maintain about 2,000 troops in 
international military operations, while Norway and Finland are looking at keeping 
an unspecified, but somewhat smaller, number of troops abroad (Danish Ministry 
of Defence 2009, 6; Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009a, 42; Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence 2008; Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009b).4 While not possessing 
armed forces as such, Iceland nevertheless also aims to provide trained individuals 
for peacekeeping and peace-building missions through the Iceland Crisis Response 
Unit (ICRU), which numbered about 30 positions in the field during 2007 (Iceland 
Crisis Response Unit 2008, 6–7). Iceland also helps shoulder the financial burden 
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of such missions by contributing to NATOs budget as well as directly towards the 
costs of other countries’ international military operations. For example, when Turkey 
deployed Black Hawk helicopters to Afghanistan in 2005, Iceland and Luxemburg 
joined together in paying for their deployment (Shea 2005, 12).
Faced with the challenge of techflation, the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ and 
increasing demands for costly international military operations abroad, most western 
countries have responded by downsizing their forces. The number active soldiers in 
NATO member states fell from nearly 6 million in 1985, to 3.5 million in 2007, 
even as the Alliance enlarged from 16 to 28 member countries (NATO 2009, 9). 
The Nordic states are again no exception. As a result of their own rising costs and 
falling purchasing power, force size in the Nordic countries has largely followed the 
general western trend of rapid downscaling. The number of active duty troops in 
the Nordic countries has nearly halved, from about 160 000 in 1989, to about 
85 000 in 2010 (IISS 1989, 69, 83, 97, 100; 2010, 126, 150, 182, 192). The 
reduction in Nordic reserve forces is even more dramatic. If one disregards the lightly 
armed Home Guard, inactive reserve forces have fallen by more than 90 per cent in 
all of the Nordic states except Finland.
However, while subject to many of the same cost-challenges as small states, 
large states such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, do have one signifi-
cant advantage. The size of their armed forces still allows them to field a national 
support apparatus to equip, train and support their armed forces if they so choose. 
The smaller European countries are forced to do the same, but on a much smaller 
scale. As a result small states are now approaching the point at which they will find it 
increasingly difficult to retain ‘balanced’ and ‘full-fledged’ armed forces with the full-
range of ‘normal’ military capabilities. As the armed forces shrink in size, some of 
their military capabilities become so small, they are no longer cost-effective, and may 
not even be technically viable. When this happens, the capability is said to have gone 
below ‘critical mass’.5 As the Swedish Chief of Defence, General Sverker Göranson, 
argues, ‘it’s easy for a big nations like the United States, with many aircraft and other 
stuff,’ but, he goes on, ‘we have much less, so we have to find different ways of doing 
this’ (Muradian 2009).
A proposed remedy for this problem has been to increase international coopera-
tion in defence. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War the Nordic countries have 
been developing ways of cutting costs including wider international cooperation and 
closer inter-Nordic cooperation within the defence sector. Again, this is in no way a 
uniquely Nordic response. Even the larger European states, which are not immedi-
ately in danger of going below critical mass for most of their capabilities, have moved 
to widen their international cooperation. As the UK Ministry of Defence noted in a 
2010 Green Paper:
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Further integrating our capabilities with those of our key partners and allies 
[…] would place limits on our ability to act nationally. But it would deliver 
a more effective contribution to international security (United Kingdom 
Ministry of Defence 2010, 9–10).
As a way for the UK to address rising costs, cooperating more extensively with 
France has been proposed, for instance on such sensitive issues as joint nuclear-
submarine patrols (Mayer 2010). NATO and the EU have both been advocating 
more cooperation and harmonisation across countries as well. NATOs Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is calling for greater equipment harmonisation, 
questioning whether ‘we really need so many different types of infantry combat vehi-
cles, or radios, or helicopters?’ while remarking that ‘it makes no sense for Europe to 
have 16 naval shipyards and 12 separate manufactures of armoured vehicles’ (Hale 
2010). General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of the EU military Committee, agrees: there 
is ‘an obvious need to rationalise’ he says, and it ‘is not just a matter of better man-
agement; it has direct implications for the safety of our soldiers’ (Tigner 2010, 34).
Current Nordic attempts to work more closely together on security and defence 
matters is not the first time inter-Nordic cooperation has been on the cards. Previ-
ous attempts to work together at the ‘high politics’6 level have, however, met with 
limited success. Following the meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers in Reykjavik 
in March 2010 the ministers wrote in joint article, ‘it is also a fact that [Nordic 
cooperation] is characterised by lots of good intentions but perhaps less by concrete 
action’ (Espersen et al. 2010). This admission represents a quite common view of 
Nordic ambitions for ‘high politics’ cooperation, although one not usually expressed 
by political leaders. Since the Second World War the region has excelled at prac-
tical, functional, ‘low politics’ cooperation in areas like labour migration, cultural 
exchange and the Nordic passport union. However, equally successful examples of 
cooperation to ensure vital national interests and national security have been few 
and far between (Schiller 1984). Is the present momentum towards cooperation on 
defence and security policy likely to prove the exception to the rule?
Chapter 1 in this study adopts a historical view, provides the historical back-
ground for the evolution of Nordic military cooperation up to the founding of NOR-
DEFCO. Chapter 2 deals with the disparate membership of the Nordic states in 
international security organisations, and argues that rather than being an obstacle to 
Nordic cooperation, it is an opportunity. Chapter 3 adopts a regional perspective on 
the Nordic area. It outlines the very different conceptions of the Nordic governments 
to regional threats and challenges, explaining why they are both unable and unwill-
ing to adopt a unified Nordic approach to security and defence in their home region. 
Chapter 4 outlines a practical view of cooperation, and the impact of past and future 
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cooperative efforts of the Nordic states. As long as the Nordic states are reassured 
that they are not committing themselves to dangerous dependencies, Nordic coop-
eration is an eminently logical way to preserve and generate military capability in the 
face of economic and operational pressures.
Chapter 5 looks at cooperation from the vantage point of the Nordic armed 
forces, and argues that the core of the group is Norway and Sweden, whose defence 
structures are somewhat similar. Finland is an enthusiastic participant, but has a 
very different military structure; Denmark is eminently suitable as a partner, but is 
less interested in Nordic cooperation than the others; Iceland is limited in its partici-
pation due to its lack of proper armed forces. Finally, Chapter 6 adopts a domestic 
perspective on cooperation, arguing that some of the most pressing obstacles to 
effective Nordic military cooperation may be domestic reactions to unfair distribu-
tion of gains in NORDEFCO and general opposition to moving jobs abroad. Another 
likely obstacle is complications from having to take account of defence industrial 
policies in the different Nordic lands. Certain domestic political constellations will 
favour Nordic cooperation more than others. Finally, Chapter 7 attempts to sum-
marise the arguments and findings, and add a concluding remark on NORDEFCO’s 
future.

A brief history of 
N ORDEFCO
During the Second World War Norwegian and Danish troops were trained in S weden, 
with the active aid of the Swedish Armed Forces, in anticipation of the liberation 
of their countries from German occupation (Skogrand 2004, 93–97; Frantzen, 
C lemmesen, and Friis 2008, 261–262). However, during the Cold War close secu-
rity and defence cooperation in a Nordic setting was made difficult by the different 
alignments of the Nordic states; Denmark, Norway and Iceland having joined NATO 
in 1949, while Sweden and Finland were nonaligned. Negotiations had been under-
taken in 1948–49 for a Scandinavian defence union, but the idea came to naught 
(Sverdrup 1996, 303–341; Bjereld, Johansson, and Molin 2008, 94–111). The 
ambit of the Nordic Council, established in 1952, was therefore restricted to non-
security related cooperation. A highly successful practical partnership nevertheless 
developed under the Nordic Council, including the Nordic passport union, Nordic 
labour market, cooperation on education and science, and several cultural exchange 
programmes (Eriksen and Pharo 1997, 147–168; Eriksen 1999, 139–142).
Despite their different security policy alignments, Denmark, Norway and S weden 
cooperated informally on military matters, particularly intelligence and air operations 
(Eriksen 1999, 142–145; Petersson 2006; Petersson 2003). The Nordic states 
also jointly pioneered ‘traditional’ UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, 
providing about 25 per cent of the personnel serving in UN peacekeeping missions 
in the period, and cooperating closely in New York and in the field (Jakobsen 2006, 
10–45). After the end of the East–West confrontation, the Nordic states were there-
fore able to draw on a legacy of cooperation to deepen their military partnership, and 
the new functional military partnerships which developed often came to mirror areas 
where there had been informal cooperation during the Cold War (Petersson 2010c, 
254).
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In 1991, as the Cold War came to a definitive end, the Nordic states lifted the 
taboo on discussing foreign policy in the Nordic Council. Sweden’s and Finland’s 
increased freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy was an important reason for this 
(Eriksen 1999, 145–147). Following both countries’ entry into NATO’s Partner-
ship for Peace (PfP) in 1994, the Nordic states established the Nordic Armaments 
Co-operation (NORDAC) to coordinate development and procurement programmes. 
They also sought to enhance coordination and cooperation in the growing number 
of peace support operations by establishing a Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for 
Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) in 1997, which replaced the system of Nor-
dic cooperation on UN peacekeeping that had existed for much of the Cold War. 
NORDCAPS offered joint Nordic training for peace support operations, as well as 
coordinated Nordic contributions to capacity building and security sector reform in 
weak and developing states.
However, while deemed a success by the Nordic governments, many of the 
initial cost cutting measures such as procuring major equipment systems and de-
ploying jointly did not succeed entirely according to expectations. For example, in 
September 2001, Denmark abandoned the Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme 
and selected the AgustaWestland EH101 helicopter, rather than the NHIndustires 
NH90 selected by Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Viking submarine project also 
proved divisive. Finland was never a member, Norway went from participant to ob-
server status in 2003, and Denmark withdrew altogether in 2004 when the country 
ceased having submarines (Hagelin 2006, 169–171).
Attempts at larger-scale joint deployments under NORDCAPS also proved dif-
ficult. In 1995 the Nordic states deployed a Nordic–Polish brigade to Bosnia as 
part of NATO’s Implementation Force (Gjeseth 2008, 163–164). This was the 
first time formerly neutral Sweden and Finland had participated in a NATO mission, 
and was considered as a possible model for future deployments (Dörfer 1997, 53–
56). However, while the Nordic states did initially establish a force-catalogue under 
NORDCAPS in 2003, with the aim of enabling them to deploy a brigade-sized 
force for international operations, this goal was abandoned along with the force pool 
in 2006. Nordic participation in other multinational forces, such as the EU battle-
groups and NATOs Response Force, seemed to make such a Nordic force obsolete 
(Jakobsen 2007, 460–461). The Danish-led Multinational Stand-by High Readi-
ness Brigade for UN Operations, known as SHIRBRIG, which had a heavy Nordic 
presence, was also deactivated in 2008 (Ritzau [Danish news agency] 2008). By 
the late 2000s the main military activities under a purely Nordic framework were 
training, capability enhancement and security sector reform efforts in Africa, the 
Balkans and Ukraine (Ulriksen 2007b, 556–557). However, the spiralling costs 
of modern military equipment, combined with shrinking force size, would neces-
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sitate further money saving measures, i.e. by pursuing wider inter-Nordic military 
cooperation.
Two separate national studies by the armed forces of Norway and Sweden in 
2007 identified rising costs and the shrinking of some parts of their force structures 
as key challenges to their armed forces, and emphasised cooperation with their Nor-
dic neighbours as a possible remedy (Norwegian Chief of Defence 2007, 63–65; 
Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters 2007, 63–72). In the summer of 2007 the 
armed forces of Norway and Sweden published a joint study outlining a partnership 
to increase cost-effectiveness and enable their militaries to retain the full range of 
military capabilities. Apart from the above-average increase in the cost of military 
equipment, the ‘critical mass’ problematique was identified as the chief challenge 
facing the Norwegian and Swedish armed forces. Critical mass was defined as ‘the 
volume which allows a structural element to be developed, maintained, trained and 
operationally employed’ (Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence 2007, 1), and 
the term extended to materiel, personnel, know-how, and whole military units. The 
envisaged cooperation would aim not to reduce national freedom of action, and 
would be a complement rather than competitor to the  countries’ close cooperation 
within NATO and the EU (Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence 2007).
The report was followed up in June 2008 by a joint Norwegian–Swedish–
F innish report outlining 140 areas of military cooperation, about 40 of which should 
be initiated by the end of 2009 (NORDSUP 2008b). The 2008 report used strong 
language to describe the options open to the Nordic countries:
Given the loss of purchasing power, small and medium sized countries will 
not be able in the close future to sustain complete and balanced armed forces. 
To put it somewhat simplified we face two options: either to share capabilities 
with strategic partners on a bilateral or multilateral basis or to face a future 
with fewer capabilities (NORDSUP 2008b, 1).
By harmonising equipment and training of the Nordic armed forces, as well as co-
ordinating and conducting joint logistics, support and force production, Norway, 
Sweden and Finland hoped to preserve as much as possible of their operational 
military capabilities. As far as Norway is concerned, the Norwegian Chief of Defence 
Sverre Diesen argued, ‘it is fundamentally about realizing that a population of 4 ½ 
million is too small to maintain a purely national defence [capability] in our time’ 
(Diesen 2008b).
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Operational structure
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The same month as the NORDSUP report was published, the foreign ministers of 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland were meeting in Luxemburg. They 
asked former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg to lead an inquiry 
into the possibility of enhancing foreign and security policy cooperation between the 
Nordic countries. The Stoltenberg report was received by the Nordic foreign min-
isters with much fanfare at an Oslo press conference, February 2009 (Stoltenberg 
2009b). While the report covered many areas beyond mere defence cooperation, 
such as maritime surveillance, the Arctic and cooperation among the foreign ser-
vices, it nevertheless had defence and security issues at its core.
Particularly noteworthy was its proposal for a Nordic ‘mutual declaration of soli-
darity’, whereby the Nordic countries would issue a mutual commitment outlining 
how they would react if one of the Nordic states became the victim of some form of 
‘external attack or undue pressure’ (Stoltenberg 2009b, 34). The declaration was 
necessary in Stoltenberg’s view because ‘it would be difficult to co-operate on de-
veloping Nordic military capabilities without first having clarified at policy level how 
they will be deployed in a crisis situation’ (Stoltenberg 2009a). While the form of 
the declaration should not prejudice existing obligations of the Nordic countries to 
the UN, EU or NATO, a mutual guarantee would nevertheless push Nordic defence 
cooperation beyond the technical-military level and propel it into the realm of high-
politics.
In November 2008, as follow up to the June report, Norway, Sweden and 
F inland were joined by Denmark and Iceland in the signing of a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) establishing the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures 
(NORDSUP) as a formal organisation (NORDSUP 2008a). By bringing Iceland and 
Denmark into the new structure, NORDSUP became a truly Nordic cooperation. 
The NORDSUP Steering Committee held its first meeting in Helsinki in January 
2009, when Finland assumed the chairmanship. A key goal of the Finnish chair-
FIGURE 1: The NORDSUP idea. Source: NORDSUP. Nordic Supportive Defence Structures 
(NORDSUP) - Progress Report, 4.
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manship was to create an overarching structure encompassing all aspects of Nordic 
defence cooperation (Finnish Ministry of Defence 2009). This was accomplished in 
November 2009, when the Nordic ministers of defence met in Helsinki to sign a 
MoU establishing NORDEFCO (NORDEFCO 2009). The new organisation created 
a common institutional structure out of NORDSUP, NORDCAPS, and NORDAC.
NORDEFCO has an annually rotating chairmanship; held by Norway in 2010. 
The role of chair includes responsibility to call, supervise and report meetings. All 
decision-making is based on consensus, but a country can choose to ‘opt out’ of 
an activity or project, in which case the other participants can commit themselves 
freely to that activity or project (Nordic Defence Policy Steering Committee 2009). 
Those choosing to ‘opt out’ are free later to join all elements of the cooperation. Thus 
NORDEFCO will enable and in fact encourage integration à la carte, where partici-
pants are free to pick and choose projects in which to get involved. 
At the political level, the Ministers of Defence will meet at least twice a year, as 
will the Chiefs of Defence.7 State Secretaries or Permanent Secretaries will meet at 
least once a year. The NORDEFCO Steering Group, consisting of officials at direc-
tor general or deputy permanent secretary of state for defence level, will have more 
of the day-to-day responsibility for running NORDEFCO, and will ‘steer, identify, 
develop, implement and monitor activities’ (NORDEFCO 2009, 4). It will in turn 
task the Military Coordination Committee, which will consist of officials at the stra-
tegic military level. The Committee will seek to coordinate, implement and monitor 
military-level issues, as well as provide the steering group with military advice.8 The 
NORDCAPS Steering Group used to meet two or three, and the Military Coordina-
tion Committee, four to six times a year (Jakobsen 2006, 213–214). Now that 
there is instead a NORDEFCO Steering Group and a Military Coordination Commit-
tee, the regularity and agenda of the meetings are likely to increase.
NORDEFCO’s military organisation is subdivided into five cooperation ar-
eas, each with a responsible ‘lead-nation’. The areas are Strategic Development 
(S weden); Capabilities (Finland); Human Resources & Education (Denmark); Train-
ing & Exercises (Norway); and Operations (Sweden) (NORDEFCO/NORDCAPS 
2010). Unlike the chairmanship of NORDEFCO, which rotates annually, lead na-
tion responsibilities will rotate on a biannual basis in order to foster continuity and 
focus within each area.9 
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This structure replaced the six multilateral working groups that existed in NORD-
SUP, dealing with land, sea, air, logistics, human resources, and analysis and de-
velopment, each in turn with numerous subgroups (NORDSUP 2008b, 2–3). It 
also replaced and absorbed NORDAC’s 44 different groups (as they were in 2008) 
dealing with investigation, co-operation, projects and pre-projects. Although most 
met very infrequently, if at all, there was nevertheless an impressive range of ongoing 
and potential projects (NORDAC Co-ordination Group 2008).
Finally, the new organisation incorporated NORDCAPS’ structure and work-
ing groups, as well as the almost 30 training courses for Nordic and non-Nordic 
participants in the conduct of international peace support operations (NORDEFCO/
NORDCAPS 2010). However, NORDCAPS’ small permanent multilateral plan-
ning element, based in Stockholm, which worked full-time on planning and co-
ordinatio n, would not be continued. Instead, a new NORDEFCO Coordination Staff 
would be based in the national capitals, coordinating activities from there (Franzén 
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FIGURE 2: NORDEFCO Organisation. (Source: Norwegian Ministry of Defence.)
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2010 [conversation]). Norway, Sweden and Finland also exchange liaison officers, 
who are embedded within the integrated Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the Swed-
ish Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Finnish Defence Command. Denmark also 
dispatched one officer to the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, but not to its 
counterparts in Helsinki or Oslo (Anonymous 5 [Interview]; Ericsson 2010 [In-
terview]; Andersen 2010 [Interview]). By exchanging officers the Nordic countries 
aimed to ease and facilitate cooperation across the full-range of cooperation areas 
(Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2010).
The new unified organisation officially started work in December 2009, thought 
it would take months before the three original organisations actually became fully in-
tegrated and began working properly. Nevertheless, expectations were high, and not 
just within the governments and the armed forces, but among the informed mem-
bers of the Nordic public as well. The momentum towards closer Nordic defence 
cooperation had received quite a bit of media attention, particularly the Stoltenberg 
report, and as a consequence much of the Nordic public was aware that something 
was going on with regards to foreign, security and defence policy cooperation among 
the Nordic states.

NORDEFCO and t he 
E uropean security 
i nstitutions
One of the most frequent criticisms of Nordic defence cooperation is that it will not 
work due to dissimilar membership of European security organisations. After all, 
this was one of the key reasons why this form of cooperation was said to be next 
to impossible during the Cold War (Riste 2001, 247–255). On the surface it is a 
powerful argument, since the Nordic states formally retain the same security policy 
orientation they pursued during the Cold War.
For most of the Cold War, NATO member states Norway, Denmark and I celand 
were bound by the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington D.C., April 1949. 
The most important aspect of this treaty was Article 5, which states that ‘an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against them all’ (NATO 2001, 528).10 Finland and Sweden, although 
formally bound by the UN Security Council decisions under Chapter VII, dealing 
with ‘Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Act of Aggression’ (UN 
2006, 27), nevertheless planned for neutrality in wartime for the duration of the 
Cold War (Winnerstig 2001, 76–77; Sivonen 2001, 92–93). In any case, the 
deadlock in the Security Council for most of the Cold War made the UN an impotent 
collective security organisation (Mayall 2007, 6–11; Roberts and Zaum 2008).
As of 2010, Norway, Denmark and Iceland are still members of NATO, an al-
liance now numbering 28 countries in North America and Europe, while Sweden 
and Finland remain nonaligned countries. The two latter countries have, however, 
joined the EU, which has become increasingly important in the defence field after 
the Cold War, and which is viewed by both Sweden and Finland as a key organisa-
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tion for maintaining European security. Norway and Iceland remain, however, non-
members of the EU, and Denmark, while a member, has chosen to ‘opt out’ of 
EU defence-related cooperation. Can these differences be reconciled within a joint 
Nordic defence and security design, or are they insurmountable obstacles?
One could argue that the present situation offers a poor opportunity for integrat-
ing the armed forces of the Nordic states. After all, sovereign states do not create 
shared military capabilities unless they can be absolutely certain they will be avail-
able when needed. Even among allied countries, such integration has often proven 
exceedingly difficult.11 On the surface, the security policy situation put in place in 
1949 remains in place in 2010, over two decades after the collapse of the bipolar 
‘overlay’ in Europe (Buzan et al. 1990, 36–41).12 Only three of the five Nordic 
states are formally allies, and pronounced differences exist with regard to security 
organisation membership, further complicating defence cooperation among the 
Nordic countries.
 However, such a formalistic view of security policy ignores the fact that practi-
cal security policy has changed significantly in all the Nordic states. The so-called 
‘Nordic Balance’ no longer exists (Brundtland 1965). Sweden and Finland have 
both drawn considerably nearer to the Western alliance, and ceased using the term 
‘neutrality in wartime’.13 This change was facilitated by the altered intentional envi-
ronment after the Cold War.
In 1992, Finland negotiated a new bilateral treaty with Moscow. This replaced 
the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which Finland 
had been coerced into signing with the Soviet Union in 1948. The treaty had obliged 
Finland ‘not to conclude any alliance or join any coalition’ directed against the Soviet 
Union, defend its territory from being used by ‘Germany or any state allied with the 
latter’ to attack the USSR, as well as ‘if necessary’ to conduct military consulta-
tion with and receive military aid from Moscow under the aforementioned circum-
stances (Meinander 2006, 188–190, 227).14 In 1994, Sweden and Finland both 
became active participants in NATO’s PfP, which meant increasing harmonisation of 
their defence forces with those of NATO countries through their participation in the 
NATO PfP Planning and Review Process. Finally, as we have seen, in 1995, Swed-
ish and Finish forces joined for the first time a NATO-led enforcement mission in 
the Balkans, i.e. the Implementation Force in Bosnia (Dörfer 1997, 40–56; Dörfer 
2007, 130).
Sweden’s and Finland’s membership of the EU the same year also had implica-
tions for their security policy, especially following the development of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999.15 Swedish and Finnish documents 
now refer to the EU as a ‘political alliance’ (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009a, 17; 
Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009a, 72), and both countries support the deep-
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ening of the CSDP. Both also welcome the new solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty 
obliging member states to give aid in case an EU state is the victim of ‘armed aggres-
sion on its territory’ (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009a, 17–18; Finnish Prime 
Minister’s Office 2009b, 26–35).16 Since currently 21 out of 27 EU member states 
are also NATO members,17 EU membership therefore ties Sweden and Finland in-
creasingly into the existing transatlantic security community. The increasingly close 
de facto security orientation by Sweden and Finland towards NATO would seem to 
suggest relatively few security policy obstacles in the way of closer cooperation by 
the Nordic countries; ultimately, the relationship of Sweden and Finland with NATO 
seems to be ‘to accept almost everything else in the field of security cooperation 
except collective defence’ (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 2001, 68). On an operational 
level, such as exchanging data or joint exercises, things would be easier if they were 
NATO members, but their non-membership is not a showstopper.18
 Norway and Iceland have also developed much of the same relationship with 
the CSDP as Sweden and Finland with NATO: almost full participation despite 
non-membership. Norway in particular has been actively involved as a third country 
in CSDP, has played a constructive part in furthering CSDP, and sought influence 
through participation rather than obstruction; i.e. the country has not complicated 
CSDP–NATO relations as Turkey has done (Græger 2002, 44–55; Tofte 2003). 
Norway has become an active partner of the European Defence Agency (EDA), hav-
ing signed an Administrative Arrangement with EDA in 2006, and has ‘opted in’ to 
a number of EDA projects. Norway continues to seek to deepen its cooperation with 
the agency (Lindbäck 2009). Iceland has also been taking an active part in CSDP 
matters, despite its small size and highly limited means. Among other things ,the 
country has been making its ICRU available for EU operations since 2001 (Bailes 
and Thorhallsson 2006).
The main problem with Norwegian and Icelandic non-membership of the EU 
is that they are sometimes unable to take part in intra-EU cooperation and groups. 
However, Nordic cooperation could actually be a way for Norway and Iceland to 
penetrate these groups and projects (Norwegian Ministry of Government Adminis-
tration and Reform, 22). It would give Norway and Iceland access to the EU, and 
Sweden and Finland access to NATO, both identified by the Nordic governments as 
one of the key advantages of Nordic defence cooperation (see e.g. Norwegian Min-
istry of Government Administration and Reform, 24).
Of the Nordic countries only Denmark, which only accepted the Maastricht 
Treaty in May 1993 after receiving several reservations, remained detached from 
those parts of the CSDP dealing with defence issues (Svensson 1994, 70–77). One 
key consequence of the Danish opt-out is that Denmark is unable to take part in 
European defence cooperation, with corresponding loss of influence on European 
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security and defence issues. A concrete problem for Nordic defence cooperation has 
been Denmark’s inability to take part in the Nordic battlegroup, to which Sweden, 
Norway and Finland (as well as Estonia and Ireland) are active contributors (DIIS 
2008, 57–69). Incidentally, Denmark is also the only Nordic country where the 
ability to ‘plug into’ either NATO or the EU is not considered one of the advantages 
of Nordic defence cooperation; as Denmark is a member of both organisations, this 
argument for cooperation does not apply to Denmark (Jakobsen 2006, 219). 
The Danish opt-outs also seem to have hampered Nordic defence cooperation 
at a more general level. The defence opt-out was invoked by the Danish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs as one reason for Denmark to decline to participate at the initial 
meeting on defence cooperation by the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish foreign 
ministers in October 2007 (Norwegian News Agency and Ritzau [Danish news 
agency] 2007). However, Denmark subsequently decided that the cooperation did 
not violate its reservations against European defence policy. In June 2008, Denmark 
joined the other Nordic countries in calling for what became the Stoltenberg Report 
(Stoltenberg 2009b, 5), and Denmark subsequently signed both the NORDSUP 
MoU in November 2008 and the NORDEFCO MoU in November 2009 (NORD-
SUP 2008a; NORDEFCO 2009).
To sum up, Sweden and Finland have very few de facto reservations against 
practical cooperation with NATO, Norway and Iceland have as few against the 
CSDP, and Denmark has only to avoid Nordic cooperation whenever EU defence 
issues are involved. In other words, the disparate memberships of the Nordic coun-
tries in these organisations present few seemingly insuperable problems. In fact, the 
most commonly noted effect of Nordic cooperation is as a way to overcome the dis-
advantages stemming from disparate Nordic memberships of these organisations. 
By cooperating closely with the Nordic NATO countries, Sweden and Finland could 
achieve greater influence in NATO, and Norway and Iceland would gain as much 
influence in the EU through Sweden, Finland and Denmark. These disparate mem-
berships could therefore make for ‘constructive asymmetry’, according to Norwegian 
State Secretary for Defence, Espen Barth Eide (Härnqvist 2008, 33).
The only way NORDEFCO’s relations with NATO and the EU could become 
problematic is if it tried to be an alternative rather than a supplement to these or-
ganisations. The ambition has always been for Nordic cooperation to do the lat-
ter, providing a ‘supplemental approach in providing the capabilities and forces 
r equired by [NATO and the EU]’ (NORDSUP 2008b, 1). The Nordic countries 
stress that enhanced regional cooperation is in line with wider European develop-
ments. However, there are those who argue that what NORDEFCO aims to do is 
better handled directly through NATO or the EU because duplication is a real risk. 
According to Magnus Petersson, NORDEFCO may be encroaching on areas that are 
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already handled by NATO and CSDP/EDA. If so, it risks creating duplicating struc-
tures that might lead to a less, rather than more, efficient utilization of resources 
(P etersson 2010c; Petersson 2010a). And as Tuomas Forsberg also points out, 
the pressure to find better cost-effective solutions for Nordic defence could just as 
easily be dealt with within a European or transatlantic setting, where the potential 
for utilizing ‘economies of scale’ is even greater than in the Nordic setting (Forsberg 
2010, 134). Indeed, NATO and the EU have undertaken a number of capability 
building and improvement schemes, some of which the Nordic states have found it 
worthwhile to join.
On strategic air lift, Europe’s perhaps greatest capability shortfall, twelve EU 
states have joined together to pool services and transport aircraft in the European 
Air Transport Fleet. It is to be developed in the period 2014–17, and will include 
joint purchasing, providing and exchanging flying hours, as well as pooling support 
functions. NATO has taken measures of its own under the NATO Airlift Manage-
ment Organisation, which ten NATO states, including Norway, have joined, plus 
Finland and Sweden. Based in Hungary, the organisation operates three internation-
ally manned C-17 aircraft, performing airlift missions for NATO, EU and UN opera-
tions (IISS 2009, 152–155). Remarkably, despite being a NATO project, Sweden 
is second only to the US in its purchase of flight hours from the C-17s. The unit 
Deputy Commander is Swedish, as are ten of its pilots and fifteen of its air and 
ground personnel (FMV 2010, 19).
A lack of unmanned aerial vehicles is another European capability shortfall. 
NATO is looking to remedy this by drawing on its experience of Airborne Warning 
and Control Systems (AWACS). Since the 1980s, NATO has successfully main-
tained a fleet of AWACS aircraft, paid for jointly by the alliance and manned by 
multinational crews. NATO is now using this model to acquire a pooled ground 
surveillance system, based on the RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle. 
The fifteen participating nations include Norway and, prior to withdrawing in June 
2010, Denmark, though no non-NATO Nordic countries have joined so far (North-
rop Grumman 2009; Lauritzen and Vangkilde 2010). EDA has also been trying to 
address one of the most pressing force-generation problems facing the European 
armed forces, that of deploying more helicopters to international military operations. 
It has been doing so by trying to coordinate research and development efforts, as well 
as by promoting harmonisation of equipment requirements and collaborative pro-
curements (IISS 2009, 152–155). The agency has also undertaken an Advanced 
European Jet Pilot Training programme, with a view to having initial operating ca-
pacity by 2017–18. It will include sharing flight hours on simulators and flight 
training between nations (EDD 2010a, 4).
These are all good examples of the EU and NATO’s pursuit of projects simi-
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lar in nature to those envisaged by NORDEFCO, such as joint acquisitions, equip-
ment harmonisation, joint training and education. However, when asked why they 
chose not to pursue a wide tranche of NORDEFCO’s portfolio in a European or a 
transatlantic setting, both of which are larger with even better economies of scale 
than NORDEFCO, Swedish, Finnish, and to a lesser extent, Norwegian defence 
officials respond that NATO, and especially the EU, are too slow, large, heterogene-
ous and cumbersome (Anonymous 5 [interview]; Ericsson 2010 [interview]; Toveri 
2010 [interview]; Anonymous 4 [interview]). The small size and similar decision-
making culture of the Nordic countries means that ‘everybody knows one another’, 
can communicate regularly and rapidly, and often make decisions in a speedy and 
un-bureaucratic fashion (Sallinen 2010 [interview]). Going all out for NATO and/or 
the EU is the backup solution if NORDEFCO fails, but as a primary solution these 
organisations are not seen as the ideal way of cutting costs quickly at the moment.
For Sweden, the EU would be the obvious choice, but it too is seen as too large 
and too slow to be a feasible alternative to NORDEFCO (Anonymous 5 [interview]; 
Ericsson 2010 [interview]). The alternative for Sweden is to ‘muddle through’, mak-
ing painful cuts in the support structure of the armed forces and free resources for 
operational forces and investments (Dalsjö 2010 [interview]). For Norway, the alter-
native is closer cooperation with other NATO countries. Here, the ‘Nord Sea Strat-
egy’ is particularly apt. It provides for cooperation with Denmark, the N etherlands, 
Great Britain and Germany (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2008, 31). However, 
Norway has had limited success inducing these countries into bilateral partnerships 
(Anonymous 4 [interview]). The size of two latter states make for very unbalanced 
relationships, and both have limited equipment commonality with the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. Denmark is similar in many ways, but difficult to attract into a part-
nership (Dahl et al. 2007, 26–27, 30). Only the Netherlands stands out as both a 
willing and able partner, and then primarily for the Norwegian Army (Olsen 2010b, 
12–14).
Surprisingly, Finnish defence officials cite NATO as Finland’s best second co-
operation choice should NORDEFCO stall or fail altogether. The EU is seen as too 
heterogeneous, slow moving, and based in any case on NATO standards. However, 
since NATO is a difficult political issue for Finland, this need not be the final political 
decision, at least not overtly (Toveri 2010 [interview]; Sallinen 2010 [interview]). 
However, given Finland’s lack of membership in NATO, as well as limited confi-
dence in the EU as an effective arena for defence cooperation, Nordic cooperation 
stands out as country’s best option.
For Iceland, which does not take part in NORDEFCO’s military wing, the alter-
native would be to focus more on NATO and bilateral ties with the US, UK, Demark 
and Norway. The ICRU, Iceland Defence Agency and Coast Guard already enjoys 
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excellent ties with the Norwegian and Danish Armed Forces on procurement, edu-
cation and training (Guðnason 2010 [interview]; Hafstein 2010 [interview]; Bailes 
2010 [conversation]). Since the US has had little interest in Icelandic security since 
the Cold War (Jóhannesson 2004, 128–133), and security ties with the UK have 
been weakened by the fallout over Iceland’s banking crisis, Iceland is reaching out to 
its chief Nordic partners Norway and Denmark (Ingimundarson 2009, 76; 2008, 
80–84). That they are all members of NATO makes this a comfortable arrangement, 
and means the de-facto trilateral Nordic cooperation (Iceland–Norway–Denmark) in 
the North Atlantic does not in any way come into conflict with the Atlantic Alliance.
For Denmark alone, NORDEFCO has not been the first choice in addressing 
its defence-economic challenges. It has opted instead to cut capacities wholesale 
and specialise in expeditionary operations within NATO and alongside the US and 
UK. Maintaining NATO and the EU, and securing Danish influence in and through 
these organisations, is the objective.19 Denmark has also differed most from the oth-
ers in its view of Nordic security challenges. While Russia’s resurgence is unlikely 
to change this (Jakobsen 2009), America’s relative decline, the coming of a more 
multipolar world, the melting of the polar ice and opening of the Danish (Greenland) 
Arctic areas to oil and gas exploration and extraction, may force the Danish Armed 
Forces to focus more on sovereignty protection and military crisis management mis-
sions at home and in the North Atlantic (Rasmussen 2009, 15–21). However, for 
the moment, Denmark looks set to participate in NORDEFCO on a merely ad hoc 
basis.
Precisely because it is seen as a fast-moving and thus avant-garde venture, most 
Nordic officials are very pleased with Nordic defence cooperation’s very favourable 
reception in the transatlantic security community (Härnqvist 2008, 33). Initially, 
Washington was sceptical about the intentions of Nordic defence cooperation. While 
pleased with its potential to generate more capabilities for NATO and EU missions, 
Washington was nevertheless concerned that it could also reflect a shift away from 
NATO by the Centre-Left Norwegian government, as well as weakening the chances 
for the F-35 as Norway’s next fighter aircraft (Hilde 2010 [conversation]; Norwe-
gian News Agency 2010). However, according to Norway’s Chief of Defence Gen-
eral Harald Sunde, NORDEFCO is currently being met with enthusiasm, both in 
Europe and North America, as an example of practical military cooperation between 
NATO and non-NATO members (Arnulf 2010, 10). Indeed, other regions are look-
ing at the model for close Nordic defence cooperation with interest, says Swedish 
Minister of Defence Tolgfors (O’Dwyer 2009b). ‘Nordic countries have shown the 
way’ argues a senior EDA official (Zandee 2010, 31). In the Balkans, NORDEFCO 
has been praised and held forth as an initiative the region should seek to emulate 
(Voinea and Bălăceanu 2009). The Baltic states have already expressed their desire 
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to join (O’Dwyer 2009d). Thus, Nordic cooperation is not viewed as a competitor by 
other EU or NATO states, rather as a model-type of regional cooperation.20 Indeed, 
as the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Håkan Syrén, argues, be-
cause moving ahead with all 27 countries has been so demanding, ‘we must find, I 
would say, clusters, groups of countries, encourage them to work together, and that 
is a good start’ (EDD 2010b, 3).
Were the EU or NATO to develop projects duplicating those of NORDEFCO, 
the latter could be discontinued or merged with the larger organisations’. This was 
done with the NORDCAPS force pool, which was deactivated in 2006 due to func-
tional overlap with the Nordic EU battlegroup (Jakobsen 2007, 460). The Nordic 
states could also cooperate on joint acquisitions, maintenance and training with oth-
er northern European states, either individually or collectively. That there is an inter-
est for such cooperation was apparent when Britain, Poland and Germany chose to 
participate at the November 2010 Nordic–Baltic defence minister meeting in Oslo 
(Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2010c). The same month Sweden and Germany 
published a ‘food for thought’ paper entitled ‘Intensifying Military Cooperation in 
Europe’, which was first discussed at the meeting of EU defence ministers at Ghent, 
September 2010. The proposition largely echoed the 2007 Norwegian–Swedish 
initiative, from which NORDSUP eventually evolved. It called upon clusters of EU 
member states ‘to identify adequate partners for cooperation in specific areas’, with 
EDA and other EU bodies acting as facilitators and co-ordinators. Nordic coop-
eration could easily proceed on such a ‘cooperative cluster’ basis within the Ghent 
initiative (German and Swedish ministries of defence 2010). 
However, to avoid NORDEFCO growing too large and cumbersome, and losing 
its present edge as a smaller and nimbler organisation than those it seeks to com-
plement, NORDEFCO’s membership should probably not be enlarged too much or 
too quickly. A good case can therefore be made to keep the Baltic states, as well as 
any other would-be applicants, as partners rather than full-fledged NORDEFCO 
members, at least for the time being. The Nordic states would nevertheless be able 
to strengthen their defence-related cooperation with the Baltic states, for instance by 
implementing the recommendations of the Nordic and Baltic countries’ (NB8) Wise 
Men report of August 2010 (Danish and Latvian Ministries of Foreign Affairs 2010, 
11–12). If NORDEFCO is a success it will be seen as a natural candidate for a new 
‘cluster group’ of countries cooperating closely on defence within Europe, and, prob-
ably, also widely seen as a model other countries might emulate.
Is there a shared Nordic 
s ecurity outlook?
Based on his conversations with politicians in all of the Nordic countries, Torvald 
Stoltenberg began his 2009 report by articulating ‘a widespread desire in all the 
Nordic countries to strengthen Nordic cooperation’ and also ‘a widely held percep-
tion that because of their geographical proximity, the Nordic countries have many 
foreign and security policy interest in common’ (Stoltenberg 2009b, 5). Some com-
mon security interest is pretty much a precondition for Nordic defence cooperation; 
if national interests diverge too much, it would be hard to establish and maintain 
cooperation across such a wide range of issues. It is, however, no secret that there 
are also many differences separating the security outlooks of the Nordic states. Are 
the Nordic states sufficiently unified in their security outlooks for their common 
interests to facilitate the close military cooperation envisaged, or will the differences 
undermine the attempt to organise military cooperation?
When viewed historically, the idea that geopolitics can ‘naturally’ serve to pull 
the Nordic states in the same direction is at best questionable. Historically, geopoli-
tics has often divided the Nordic region more than it has unified it on hard security 
issues. At ‘moments of truth’ for Nordic unity, Bernt Schiller argues, Nordic gov-
ernments have always chosen the short-term option, putting national interest over 
Nordic unity. When push comes to shove, common interests on hard security issues 
have always been too weak (Schiller 1984, 226; see also Petersson 2010c, 241) A 
few historical examples illustrate this point.
The idea of Nordic unity was strong in the national Romanticism of the mid 
nineteenth century, but when put to the test in the Second Schleswig War of 1864, 
Sweden-Norway chose not to come to Denmark’s aid against Prussia and Austria 
(Derry 1979, 238–248; Emstad 2008, 15–16, 66–69). After World War One 
32 OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
military cooperation among the Nordic states again became fashionable, closest of 
all between Sweden and Finland, but again the other Nordic states chose not to 
intervene when Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939 and Norway and 
Denmark by Germany in 1940 (Agrell 2000, 33–74; Holtsmark and Kristiansen 
1991). In 1948–49 negotiations were undertaken to establish a Scandinavian de-
fence union, but again efforts on behalf of Nordic unit on hard security collapsed 
in the face of insurmountable national differences (Skogrand 2004, 160–161; 
K ronvall and Petersson 2005, 35–40). The collapse of the Scandinavian defence 
union ensured a lasting security policy division within the Nordic region until the end 
of the Cold War, though some military-to-military cooperation did take place under 
the radar screen (Petersson 2003).
The above examples demonstrate Nordic unity’s poor track record in the de-
fence realm, but this need not necessarily invalidate Stoltenberg’s finding: a belief 
among policymakers that the Nordic region now constitutes a single security space, 
pulled together by shared geography. However, if this were true, one would expect 
the security outlooks of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland to grow 
increasingly alike. Faced with shared problems in a shared geographical space, the 
Nordic security priorities for their own region should look much the same. However, 
this assumption does not bear closer scrutiny, particularly if one considers ‘hard’ 
security questions. Describing the situation, Lieutenant General Markku Koli, Chief 
of Defence Command Finland, says, ‘each country seems to be primarily facing a dif-
ferent point of the compass. Norway’s defence interests lie in the North, Finland’s in 
the East, those of Sweden in the West and those of Denmark in the South’ (Mattila 
and Härkönen 2009, 6). According to Clive Archer, a consequence of these differ-
ences has been ‘a less than enthusiastic’ response ‘from the Nordic capitals’ to the 
Stoltenberg report (Archer 2010a, 14). While ongoing cooperation is likely to take 
things ‘to a newer level of activity’ (Archer 2010b, 70), Archer does not see much 
hope in the current process reaching its outlined goals for the next ten to fifteen 
years; for that the strategic positions of the Nordic states are simply too different 
(Archer 2010b, 69–70).
Finland provides perhaps the best example of this. A decade ago, Mika 
K erttunen wrote, ‘Finnish defense policy is marked by continuity, a fundamental 
difference from a number of countries in both the east and west’ (Kerttunen 2002, 
205). This is as true today as it was then. In his recent study of post-Cold War Fin-
nish defence policy, Jyri Raitasalo rates the shared border with Russia as a key factor 
in maintaining continuity in Finnish defence policy, and thus setting Finland apart 
from the other Nordic states (Raitasalo 2010). As he puts it, ‘the potential military 
threat that [Russia] represents […] has guided the reform of the Finnish defence 
system on a fairly moderate path’ (Raitasalo 2010, 152). This was re-emphasized 
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following the Russian–Georgian War in 2008, by Finnish Minister of Defence, Jyri 
Häkämies: ‘the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia 
and R ussia’ (Forss 2010, 1). As long as resources suffice to maintain a balanced ter-
ritorial defence system, an autonomous territorial defence will not be compromised 
in Finland (Martelius, Salo, and Sallinen 2007, 199). While having declined in rela-
tive importance after the Cold War, the territorial defence concept is still very much 
alive in Finnish defence policy circles (Raitasalo 2010, 96–103).
This emphasis on being able to defend itself may seem strange, given one of 
the key reasons why Finland joined the EU, i.e. the widespread view that mem-
bership would enhance Finnish security (Meinander 2006, 224–230; Browning 
2008, 240–245). Indeed, to the Finnish government, the prospect of receiving 
assistance from the other EU Member States raises the threshold of armed aggres-
sion and improves Finland’s capability to deter any possible attack’ (Finnish Prime 
Minister’s Office 2009a, 73). However, while Denmark, Norway, and Iceland trust 
NATO’s Article 5, and Sweden trusts its friends in the EU and Nordic countries, to 
Finland such assurances are insufficiently reliable (Cronberg 2006, 320–322). The 
lesson of Finnish history is that Finland can only trust itself in a crisis, and that align-
ment with foreign powers only serves to pull the country into unnecessary conflicts 
(M ouritzen 2006, 504–505; on the ‘geopolitics of the past’, see Mouritzen 2009).
Different geopolitical outlooks were also instrumental in the development of 
different approaches to security and defence policy in two of the Nordic NATO 
countries, Norway and Denmark, after the Cold War (Saxi 2010b, 61–74, 2010a, 
2011). The disappearance of a territorial threat, 1989–91, allowed Denmark to fo-
cus more on distant security challenges by the early 1990s, undertaking a major de-
fence reform to this effect in 1993–94 (Danish Ministry of Defence 1992). Danish 
efforts concentrated on combating ‘indirect threats’ to peace and stability in Europe 
as well as globally (Rasmussen 2005, 77). Close alignment with the United States 
was also important to maintain Danish influence in a unipolar world (Heurlin 2004, 
2007b, 2007a). Another major reform in 2004 scrapped the remaining territorial 
forces in Denmark, and focused the Armed Forces on expeditionary warfare on the 
one hand, while aiding civilian society to combat disasters and terrorism on the other 
(Danish Ministry of Defence 2004).
By 2010, writes Clive Archer, Denmark had ‘taken its gaze away from the larger 
Nordic region’ due to ‘the decision to reflect its position as a world trading nation by 
becoming active in global security issues not just diplomatically but with its armed 
forces’ (Archer 2010b, 69–70). According to the magazine Foreign Policy, Denmark 
was the sixth most ‘globalised’ country in the world, ahead of all the other Nordics 
(Rasmussen 2009, 14). When Denmark assumed the Presidency of the Nordic 
Council of Ministers in 2010, its focus was therefore not on local issues, but, ac-
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cording to the Danish Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to ‘consoli-
date and develop the Nordic response to globalisation’ (Grube 2010, 28). Nordic 
cooperation on embassies abroad was the Nordic foreign policy proposal of most 
immediate interest to the Danish government (Grube 2010, 28).
While Denmark went enthusiastically ‘out of area’, Norway maintained a ter-
ritorial defence posture until the early 2000s, adapting a more flexible and interna-
tional deployable force structure only through two major reforms in 1999 and 2002 
(Norwegian Ministry of Defence 1999; Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2001). The 
need to preserve NATO, increase Norwegian influence in the Alliance, and ensuring 
Alliance aid would be forthcoming when needed at home were some of the reasons 
for this shift (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2001, 19–20, 22–24; Norwegian 
Defence Policy Commission 2000, 35–37). Norwegian efforts were henceforth 
concentrated on dealing with a dual security challenge. On the one hand, combat-
ing distant and diffuse threats in an age of globalisation, on the other maintaining 
sufficient national capacity for national military crisis management in the Norwegian 
High North (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004, 12–13).
This latter dimension grew in importance as Russia reasserted itself on the 
world stage in the late 2000s, and as the economic and strategic importance of the 
Arctic region was seen to be on the rise (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2008, 12). 
The envisaged ‘non-Article 5’ scenarios for the High North were limited to the mari-
time sphere, and were thought to involve mainly air and sea forces (Diesen 2008a; 
Tamnes 2004, 245–246). The Norwegian government came to acknowledge an 
increased permanent military presence in the Norwegian High North as desirable to 
create ‘stability’. It could be achieved by making the Norwegian presence an aspect 
of the normal order of things. ‘Escalations’, i.e., having to increase this presence in 
time of need, could therefore be avoided. The armed forces had to be able to handle 
full-spectrum, high-intensity military operation on their own, until the crisis either 
dissipated or escalated into a definite NATO Article-5 situation (Ulriksen 2007a, 
151–160; Rottem, Hønneland, and Jensen 2008, 32–47).
Like Norway, Sweden maintained a reduced territorial defence organisation until 
the turn of the millennium. Sweden at first shared Norway and Finland’s continu-
ing concern with scenarios involving Russia, especially in the Baltic Sea region, but 
projections were gradually downscaled from full-scale war to limited military con-
frontations involving naval and air force units, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles 
(Swedish Defence Commission 1999, 51–58). A major defence reform was there-
fore undertaken in 1999 (Swedish Ministry of Defence 1999). In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s the threat of interstate-warfare and armed attack was considered 
to be on the wane, while other complex threats and challenges were waxing. Glo-
balisation meant that Swedish security could no longer be viewed in isolation from 
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the rest of the world (Swedish Ministry of Defence 1999, 22, 31; Swedish Ministry 
of Defence 2004, 13–14). Sweden’s immediate security is said to be virtually guar-
anteed if Finland and the Baltic states are safe, so the enhanced security situation 
enjoyed by these buffer-states to the east has given Sweden an opportunity to focus 
its energies on solving problems beyond Swedish territory and its immediate vicinity 
(Berner 2001, 131–133; Agrell 2000, 271–275). Sweden, more so than Norway 
and Finland but to a lesser extent than Denmark, has therefore experienced a de-
territorialisation of defence after the Cold War (Ljung and Neretnieks 2009, 44–45; 
Christiansson 2009, 4–9).
After 1999–2000, Jan Joel Andersson argues, Swedish security policy was 
therefore ‘marked by globalisation’ with international missions now taking ‘prec-
edence above regional concerns and national territorial defence’ (Andersson 2007, 
136). The 2008 Georgian–Russian War led to some questioning of the basic as-
sumptions of Swedish defence policy, and a delay in the upcoming defence bill in 
Sweden, but no radical re-orientation (Ringborg 2008; Holmström 2009). The 
culmination of the journey towards de-territorialisation was therefore the 2009 De-
fence Bill, which did away with almost all forces not rapidly available and deployable 
outside Swedish territory (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009a).21
Finally, like Sweden and Denmark, Iceland sees no direct military threats in 
the short or medium term, and the Arctic is thought to remain a low-tension area 
in the near future (Interdisciplinary Commission 2009, 4–5). Despite the resump-
tion of Russian strategic bomber flights near Icelandic airspace in 2007, Iceland 
remains more concerned with economic and societal security than traditional ‘hard 
security’ (Ingimundarson 2009, 78). Monitoring shipping around Iceland, improv-
ing security at sea and rescue cooperation, as well as improving capacity for dealing 
with natural disasters, are among Iceland’s wider security priorities (Gudjonsson 
2010 [interview]; Bjarnason 2010 [interview]). Nevertheless, while continuing to 
have no armed forces of its own, Iceland has become more active in the international 
security scene after the Cold War. Participating in NATO, UN and EU operations 
strengthens Iceland’s ties with these organisations, and serves to compensate for the 
lack of a territorial defence (Interdisciplinary Commission 2009, 4). In the 2000s, 
Iceland joined NATO’s Military Committee, contributed personnel to peacekeeping 
missions, and supported the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance (Ingimundarson 
2001, 299–302). 
The termination in 2006 of American military presence on Iceland led the 
country to seek closer security cooperation with Norway and Denmark, although 
mainly of a symbolic and ‘soft security’ nature (Ingimundarson 2008, 80–84). The 
loss of the US base left Icelandic air space unguarded, and the country without a 
useful rescue helicopter capacity (Jóhannesson 2004, 129). After the US withdrew, 
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Iceland took over operation of the radar stations on the island, and established the 
Icelandic Defence Agency with about fifty employees. Iceland also received a scaled-
down version of NATO Air-Policing, with aircraft stationed on the island for parts of 
the year. The Icelandic government welcomed the Stoltenberg Report’s suggestion 
that the Nordic states take on a greater share of the responsibility for this mission, 
and encouraged Swedish–Finnish participation (Granholm 2009, 46–48).
To what degree then are Nordic states unified in their security outlook and in-
terests? The similarities are many and clear. Firstly, they all share similar concerns 
about distant and diffuse threats, including failed states, terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, cross-border crime, piracy, migration, and pandem-
ics, to name a few. All consider the surveillance of their own territory and adjacent 
areas, and securing their sovereignty and sovereign rights to be key tasks. Finally, 
in the unlikely case of a large-scale war involving their territory, Denmark, Norway 
and Iceland will continue to rely on NATO and the US collective defence guarantee 
(Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2008, 17; Danish Ministry of Defence 2009, 1; 
Interdisciplinary Commission 2009). While nonaligned, Sweden nevertheless also 
emphasises the possibility to receive assistance in wartime, and expects the EU and 
the Nordic countries ‘not to remain passive’ were Sweden to be the victim of armed 
aggression (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009a, 29). Finland does not explicitly 
expect such assistance, but considers it important ‘to guarantee the reception of 
military and other assistance needed in a crisis situation’ (Finnish Prime Minister’s 
Office 2009a, 109). So far, with the exception of Finland and a full-blown war, the 
security policies and priorities of the Nordic states are nearly identical. What then 
of the differences?
First, there are differences in the threat perceptions of the Nordic states when 
it comes to the limited use of force in their vicinity, limited in the sense of requiring 
more military capacity than an ability to ‘show the flag’ and uphold sovereignty, but 
less than a full-scale territorial defence ability. This use of force, likely as an element 
of a political strategy to put pressure on the Nordic government in question, would 
be of short duration and limited in scope, but brutal in its intensity (Diesen 2008a). 
Iceland and Denmark have very little focus on this scenario, having dedicated no 
extra military resources to its eventuality. Both states have dedicated sea and air 
vessels designed for patrolling their territorial waters, but their capacity for combat 
is extremely limited.22
Sweden has earmarked a few reserve forces, and done some forward stationing 
of tanks on the island of Gotland, with warfare scenarios involving Swedish terri-
tory in mind (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009a, 64, 71–72). Overall, however, 
S weden has a ‘here and now’ perspective on military matters (Tolgfors 2008, 25), 
with the main emphasis on working alongside others in international military op-
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erations abroad (Christiansson 2010, 99). Norway also aims to provide forces for 
operations abroad, but simultaneously dedicates a good deal of its military resource 
to maintaining a military presence and crisis management capacity in its High North 
(Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2008, 18–19). Finally, with a few exceptions, all 
Finnish defence resources are intended for solving national tasks, such as countering 
a strategic strike up to and including full-scale war (Finnish Defence Forces 2008, 
40–41).
 Second, there are profound differences when it comes to which part of the 
Nordic area the Nordic states have shown any interest in. Finland and Sweden are 
mainly concerned about the Baltic Sea area.23 The environmental risk to the Baltic 
Sea is of great concern to Sweden, and 90 per cent of Swedish trade is seaborne 
(Swedish Defence Commission 2007, 42; Tolgfors 2010a, 5; Holmgren 2010, 
26).24 Likewise, protection of Finland’s sea lines of communications through the 
Baltic Sea, upon which 83 per cent of Finland imports and exports rely, is the main 
task of the Finnish Navy (Kaskeala 2009a, 12). Norway and Iceland are preoc-
cupied with their ‘High North’ and the Arctic, where both states have huge fishery 
and potential hydrocarbon resources, and where international shipping is expected 
to increase in the future (Rottem, Hønneland, and Jensen 2008, 32–47; Bjarnason 
2008; Ingimundarson 2009). Denmark is interested both in the Baltic Sea and its 
Arctic areas (Greenland), but is equally, if not more, focused on the euro-regional 
and global level (Petersen 2009a).
 What do these differences in security policy mean for Nordic military coopera-
tion? First, they mean that Denmark is unlikely to join Nordic cooperation on the ba-
sis of shared security policy interests; geographical proximity has not given Denmark 
a world view similar to those of the other Nordic states (Archer 2010b, 63–70; 
Saxi 2010b, 61–74). Altogether, Denmark has probably moved the farthest away 
from a traditional ‘Nordic’ view of security and defence (Browning 2007, 38–39). 
As one well-known Danish security expert expressed the Danish view, ‘Coopera-
tion? Why not! Just join us Danes in the Helmand province!’ (Christiansson 2009, 
11). The former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ellemann-Jensen argues that if 
Nordic defence cooperation is ‘to be meaningful, Finland and Sweden will have to 
join NATO, and Iceland and Norway will have to join the EU’ (Fugl 2009, 19).
 Sweden is also more concerned with regional and global challenges to its se-
curity than any in its immediate area. As one Swedish historian puts it, ‘If Sweden 
is facing a threat after the Cold War it is not one of invasion but of marginalisation’ 
(Malmborg 2001, 312). However, Baltic Sea issues do concern Sweden. The Rus-
sian–Georgian War of 2008 increased its focus on ‘military conflicts of interests and 
incidents in our immediate area’ (Tolgfors 2009). The German–Russian pipeline in 
the Baltic Sea also triggered some concerns about ‘local’ security issues. Comment-
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ing on the proposed pipeline, a former Swedish foreign minister warned that it had 
‘only been studied from an environmental perspective, but there are also security 
aspects to consider. For example, the need to monitor [the pipeline] may lead to 
a heavier naval presence in our neighbourhood’ (Abrahamson 2009, 60). Thus, 
Swedish enthusiasm for costly initiatives dealing with Nordic issues in the North 
Atlantic and Barents Sea is unlikely to be high, but the country would be willing, 
indeed, eager, to engage its Nordic partners in ‘soft’ and perhaps even hard security 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea area. If part of a wider quid pro quo the country could 
also be expected to engage with Nordic security cooperation beyond the Baltic Sea.
Finland and Norway share a continuing concern about their immediate area, 
and prepare for handling military incidents and crises nationally. Thus one would 
expect perhaps a near commonality of views among defence officials in Oslo and 
Helsinki. However, this is not the case. In the latter country some officials believe 
that Norway and Finland share a special bond given their mutual concerns with 
territorial security and Russia (Sallinen 2010 [interview]), but this is not believed to 
be the case among officials in the former.25 Norway remains fixated on its maritime 
areas and the High North, where the government aims to increase its military pres-
ence and readiness (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2008, 26–28). The debate in 
Norway is whether conscription is at all effective in achieving these goals, not least 
in an era said to require capital and knowledge-intensive military forces (Norwegian 
Chief of Defence 2009; Diesen 2010, 4–9). But Norway is also keen to persuade 
friends, particularly NATO allies, to cultivate and retain an interest in the security of 
the region (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 91–99). The country was mean-
while sceptical about issuing extra-NATO guarantees to Sweden and Finland; in the 
view of Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a solidarity declaration was ‘unwork-
able given Article 5’ and Norway would ‘never be in favour of having some other sort 
of declaration that would contribute towards replacing it’ (Hansen 2009, 51). The 
most concrete promise the State Secretary for Defence would offer Sweden, would 
be ‘to make sure the issue was raised within NATO’ were the country to come under 
armed attack (Fyhn 2007).
While Finland is eager to work with others in a Nordic setting, its continuing 
doctrine of self-reliance (‘trust only yourself ’) is likely to complicate security cooper-
ation on hard security issues. This is exemplified by an informal discussion between 
Norwegian and Finish officials on joint maintenance, for example of helicopters, 
during which senior Finnish officials suggested that if Finland were to send some of 
its helicopters to Norway it should receive, for example,  Norwegian Leopard 2 main 
battle tanks in return. The tanks would serve as collateral, providing Finland with 
something more than paper guaranties that the country would get its helicopters 
back were a crisis to occur while they were in Norway (Enger 2010 [conversation]). 
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Meanwhile, Finland has little to spare for its Nordic neighbours in a crisis. A depart-
ment director at the Finnish National Defence University characterised the Finnish 
view of a Norwegian conflict with Russia: ‘Certainly we would like to help, but con-
sidering our geographical position, this would most probably lead to undue pressure 
against us – a situation where all scarce resource would be needed at home’ (Archer 
2010b, 61).
Finally, Iceland would have few objections about cooperating on Nordic ‘soft 
security’ measures such as surveillance of the North Atlantic, nor hard security is-
sues such as air policing over Iceland. However, in light of their limited means, the 
country has little to offer in return. Thus, Iceland will remain an important partner 
for Denmark and Norway, who have interests in the North Atlantic, but cooperation 
with Sweden and Finland on Baltic Sea issues will be minimal.
Overall then, the Nordic region is not a unified body on hard-security issues. 
It was demonstrated most visibly by the case of Iceland and the Nordic solidarity 
declaration. The Nordic governments have been cautious about the idea of jointly 
assuming more responsibility for Iceland’s security, such as for air policing over the 
island (Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Nordic Countries 2009, 2). By their ac-
tions they have emphasised that the island’s defence remains the responsibility of 
NATO and the United States. The slow progress on the proposed ‘Nordic declara-
tion of solidarity’ also indicates a certain unwillingness to create some kind of sub-
regional security system. As the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs argued, ‘it is 
important not to do anything which undermines or creates doubts about the central 
role of NATO’ (Fyhn 2009). The scope of any such declaration is likely to be limited 
to ‘new security challenges and non-military threats’, and leave out military guaran-
ties (Faremo 2011; 6).
Far from sharing the same outlook, the view from Copenhagen is profoundly 
different from that in Helsinki. Oslo and Stockholm represent something of a via 
media, but each is also focused on its own maritime area, with the former more 
concerned about Russia than the latter. The Nordic region thus appears very much 
divided when it comes to priorities and perspectives on security, a poor basis for 
close cooperation on hard security by the Nordic states if based on an assumption 
of similar security outlooks.

NORDEFCO in practice: 
Benefits and costs
As with security organisation membership there is widespread disagreement about 
whether NORDEFCO really serves to enhance the security situation of the Nordic 
states. Proponents argue that cooperation strengthens ties among the Nordic states, 
in itself a security gain, while enabling them to produce more military power and 
solve more challenging problems. Sceptics argue that Nordic cooperation makes 
them increasingly reliant upon states that are not formal allies, creating dependen-
cies with their own inherent risks, and drawing resources away from working with 
larger and more important partners. So do the benefits from cooperation outweigh 
the potential losses? This chapter asks how NORDEFCO can help improve the se-
curity situation of the Nordic states by giving them more military resources than 
they would otherwise have available, but also undermine their military autonomy, 
with consequences for participation in international operations abroad and national 
defence at home.
 Norwegian and Swedish studies on Nordic defence cooperation see enhanced 
military capabilities for all the Nordic countries as on of the most important identifi-
able effects of successful cooperation. By enabling the Nordic states to maintain a 
larger and more balanced set of military capabilities, cooperation could provide se-
curity policy benefits (Johansen and Åtland 2007, 23; Ljung 2007, 78–79). Many 
of the initial initiatives have cost relatively little, while providing great benefits: much 
gain with little pain.
One of these ongoing ‘quick-win’ initiatives involves the coordination and or-
ganisation of joint Swedish and Norwegian logistical flights to Mazar-e-Sharif in 
Afghanistan, starting April 2010, an initiative which provides savings and greater 
efficiency at negligible investment cost (Hård af Segerstad 2010, 6). Another is the 
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joint air forces training exercises involving the Norwegian fighter wing at Bodø, the 
Swedish fighter wing at Luleå, and the Finnish fighter wing in Rovaniemi, provid-
ing all three air forces with advanced training opportunities at virtually no extra cost 
(NORDSUP 2008b, B: 2-B: 4). The joint air exercises have also received much me-
dia attention, giving it the added benefit of being a public relations ‘success story’ for 
the air forces and Nordic cooperation in general (Holm 2009; Kask 2010; B onafede 
2010).
 On the ground, the major Norwegian exercise Cold Response, to which all 
NATO and PfP countries were invited, was conducted in part on Swedish territory 
in 2010 (Rapp 2010). Swedish and Finnish forces participated, Sweden provid-
ing the second largest contingent in troop numbers after Norway, with over 1,000 
soldiers from the Army, Air Force and Home Guard (Egeberg 2010; Englund and 
Carlsson 2010, 10). The benefits to the Norwegian and Swedish forces were larger 
and better exercises, at little extra cost. Sweden wants to foster closer cooperation at 
the brigade and battalion level with Norway and Finland, and would also like to turn 
Cold Response into a co-hosted Norwegian–Swedish exercise for NATO and PfP 
countries (Mörtberg 2010 [interview].
The constraint of critical mass is also being overcome within some military 
subfields by conducting joint training and education on a unit-to-unit level, ena-
bling the retention of small, specialised capabilities that would otherwise not be 
available. By training explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) personnel from Norway, 
S weden and Denmark together, training of each country’s small EOD capacities can 
continue even while much of their EOD personnel is deployed to Afghanistan (Hård 
af Segerstad 2010 [interview]). The Norwegian army in northern Norway and their 
Swedish counterparts in northern Sweden also cooperated closely on training very 
marginal categories of specialised personnel, such as divers, where both sides were 
experiencing the ‘crunch’ of critical mass (Mörtberg 2010 [interview].
Cooperation also adds operationally deployable capabilities which would not 
otherwise be available. The joint Norwegian–Swedish helicopter arrangement, under 
which Swedish technicians are to deploy to Afghanistan to help maintain Norwegian 
Bell 412 helicopters, allows the Norwegian helicopters to remain in theatre with less 
strain on Norwegian personnel, and to extend their reach to the Swedish Provincial 
Reconstruction Team’s area of operation (Hahr 2010, 6; Hård af Segerstad 2010, 
6). This would give the Swedish contingent in Afghanistan something close to or-
ganic helicopter support, a capacity sought since 2008 (Lundgren 2009, 6). In early 
2010 Norway, Sweden and Finland also decided to run common training courses 
for their Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, through which the three coun-
tries have taken joint responsibility for an Afghan National Army Brigade (Norwegian 
Armed Forces 2010, 33).
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Initiatives which may soon get started include the exchange of recognized air 
pictures between, on the one hand, NATO, and, on the other, Sweden and F inland, 
which would improve situation awareness for all Nordic countries at little cost 
(NORDSUP 2008b, B: 2). Arrangements for Swedish and Finnish participation are 
currently being finalised, and Norway and the Baltic states are offering to act as 
coordinators and sponsors for respectively Swedish and Finnish participation in the 
NATO Air Situation Data Exchange programme (NORDSUP 2008b, B: 2; O’Dwyer 
2009c; Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2010a). Meanwhile, projects that are simi-
lar in principle to the exchange of air situation pictures but potentially more costly 
are being undertaken in the maritime sphere.
Since 2006, Sweden and Finland have exchanged a common maritime picture 
of the Baltic Sea, through the Sea Surveillance Co-operation between Finland and 
Sweden, or SUCFIS. In 2008, an enlarged cooperation called Sea Surveillance Co-
operation in the Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) was envisaged, to cover the entire Baltic Sea 
and all the states bordering it (Kaskeala 2009a, 12–13). While EDA and the Euro-
pean Commission aim to coordinate and develop common policies among member 
states on Baltic Sea surveillance, Sweden and Finland have intended all along to 
include non-EU members in SUCBAS (EDD 2009; NORDSUP 2008b, c:1-c:2). 
By 2010, Denmark, as well as Germany, Estonia and Lithuania, had joined this 
undertaking.
Developing almost simultaneously as the Baltic Sea initiative, the Norwegian 
government in June 2010 decided to go ahead with plans for BarentsWatch (Nor-
wegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010), described as a ‘comprehensive monitor-
ing, prediction and information system for the [North Atlantic] High North ocean 
areas’ (SINTEF 2009, 5). The Stoltenberg Report proposed having SUCBAS and 
BarentsWatch make up the two pillars of a Nordic maritime monitoring system 
(Stoltenberg 2009b, 12–14). By the inclusion of Norway in SUCBAS and the inclu-
sion of Sweden, Finland and Denmark in BarentsWatch, each of the involved Nordic 
countries would be given greater (unclassified) maritime situation awareness.
The main crunch for these future initiatives will perhaps be the degree to which 
there is sufficient interest to pay the cost of admittance to common Nordic solutions, 
especially when such initiatives deal with areas not vital to all the Nordic countries. 
In the case of the Stoltenberg Report recommendations, Norway is holding off on 
joining SUCBAS until it is clear whether the information it provides is useful for 
Norway, and justifies the cost of joining (Røksund 2010 [interview]). As for Nor-
dic air policing over Iceland, Swedish officials were positive in principle. However, 
implementing plans for Nordic air policing is not an imminent proposition. It was a 
proposal, Sweden stresses, which requires further analysis, not least concerning the 
cost of the proposal (Ekengren 2010 [interview], Ericsson 2010 [interview]). From 
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a Swedish point of view, the emphasis on the High North and the Arctic also needed 
to be balanced against a greater focus on the Baltic Sea area (Ekengren 2010 [in-
terview]). Finnish officials also expressed limited enthusiasm for participating in air 
policing over Iceland.26 These examples demonstrate the reluctance of the Nordic 
states when it comes to participating in non-vital projects with a price tag attached.
An example of a long-term initiative, envisaged realised by 2019, is a standard-
ised Nordic mechanized battalion, Mechbat 2020. Creating commonality between 
the mechanized land forces of the Nordic states will increase cost efficiency and give 
operational benefits (NORDSUP 2008b, A: 6-A: 7). Such an endeavour would, 
if realised, be a real ‘flagship’ for NORDEFCO (Kaskeala 2009b, 8). With mostly 
identical components, the Swedish Chief of Defence General Sverker Göranson be-
lieves that the Nordic states could one day be able to operate a rotational system 
in international operations – equipment, vehicles and weapons would remain in 
theatre, while personnel from one Nordic country could rotate in to relieve another 
state’s personnel (Haglund 2009, 11). Another possible major long-term project 
concerns the joint acquisition of a common Swedish–Norwegian submarine, likely 
reducing acquisition costs by as much as a third and enabling greater teeth-to-tail 
ratio in both countries (NORDSUP 2008b, C: 8-C: 12).
If increased operational capability is the chief advantage of cooperation, what 
then are the main drawbacks? One answer is offered by Colonel Bjørn Innset, for 
whom the tolerance level of dependency on other countries is the main limiting 
factor for Nordic defence cooperation. By implication, dependency is thus the chief 
drawback to cooperation (Innset 2010, 4). Creating military dependency will have 
security policy repercussions, since the Nordic states are not formal allies, and even 
within formal alliances, making oneself dependent on others can be particularly 
risky. For example, during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, Belgium turned down a Brit-
ish request to supply ammunition to British forces in the Gulf. It caused certain 
practical difficulties for the UK and much resentment towards Belgium in Britain 
(Wallace 2005, 436). So cutting costs by outsourcing some tasks, such as muni-
tions production, to other states is never devoid of risk, even within alliances. But 
just how serious is the dependency-creating nature of Nordic defence cooperation?
A Swedish study looking at the possible consequences of Nordic cooperation 
concluded that joint procurement, upgrading and maintenance of military materiel 
and training of personnel would be ‘from a security policy point of view, pretty un-
problematic’ (Ljung 2007, 78). A Norwegian study is a little more cautious, noting 
that ‘parts of the cooperation are moving towards a degree of integration where in 
practice it may become difficult to employ our forces freely according to purely na-
tional priorities’ (Johansen and Åtland 2007, 24). This seems to be the main draw-
back in ‘peacetime’, a slight decline in national freedom of action. The exact extent was 
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not discussed at length in the NORDSUP study process, since most of its working 
groups ‘did not consider political constraints or consequences in detail’ (NORDSUP 
2008b, A: 4).
An important caveat must be noted on the discussion on dependency, namely 
that if the dual challenge of spiralling costs and critical mass means having to aban-
don some capabilities completely, sharing them with others will usually seem the 
less daunting option to the country involved. In such a ‘share it or lose it’ scenario, 
the gains of cooperation will be paramount (O’Donell 2009). The former Swed-
ish, Norwegian and Finnish Chiefs of Defence believe their countries are stand-
ing at such a crossroad, necessitating close cooperation (Diesen and Syrén 2007; 
Diesen, Kaskeala, and Syrén 2008). If one accepts this view, then the argument that 
dependency on other states is detrimental to the maintenance of an autonomous 
national defence capacity is rendered obsolete, because such a national defence ca-
pacity would be impossible to maintain without cooperation. Thus the possibility of 
abandonment creating a risk to the national defence capacity is neutralised by the Chiefs’ 
argument, since small states have no choice but to opt for some level of dependency 
or the abandonment of balanced modern Armed Forces. Nevertheless, for those who 
do not accept this argument, the question of dependency is a serious one, if not now 
then in the long term.
But cutting certain capabilities from the armed forces is also conceivable, con-
centrating instead on expanding and enhancing the quality of the remaining ones 
than would otherwise have been possible. This is the strategy Denmark has chosen 
since 2003, focusing on capabilities for high-intensity expeditionary warfare (B ruun 
2003, 34–36; see also Rasmussen 2004). This would make it impossible to main-
tain ‘balanced armed forces’ in the traditional sense, but would provide ‘niche ca-
pacities’ for employment in, e.g. coalition warfare missions.
Among the concrete proposals inherited by Nordic defence cooperation, de-
pendency would be most pronounced in the proposed joint medical and logistical 
support services. Medical services was the most ambitious short-term goal of trilat-
eral Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish cooperation; Norway and Sweden envisaged a 
joint and co-located Role 2 medical unit. In logistics, a joint or combined movement 
control taskforce was also considered, along with a Nordic hub for, respectively, stra-
tegic air and sealift (NORDSUP 2008b, D: 1–D:6). Any joint unit, particularly ones 
as crucial for deployments in international operations as medical and logistical ena-
bling forces, would necessarily involve the risk of having these assets denied when 
effective control is shared with other states. At best, this would be inconvenient and 
increase costs; at worst it would mean the deployment could not take place.
National options are also constrained by participation in cooperation in another 
way; the dependency of others will necessarily result in pressure to make necessary 
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assets available when other states wish to employ their armed forces. This is due 
to the ‘shadow of the future’ effect (see Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 232–234). 
The Nordic Battle Group (NBG) provides a good example of this in action. While 
every member retains national control over its forces, a decision to withhold forces, 
complicating and even sabotaging deployment altogether, would fundamentally un-
dermine the country’s credibility as a partner. If one is seen as a likely hamstring to 
the battlegroup’s deployment, one will not be invited to participate again (Granholm 
2006, 64). This pressure to deploy is particularly problematic for Norway, the only 
non-EU member of the NBG. Participation is Norway’s main strategy for gaining 
influence (Græger 2002), but since Norway cannot take part in intra-EU political 
deliberations on when and where to deploy, the country will face a ‘take it or leave 
it’ choice when the EU decides to deploy the NBG. Since the cost of refusal would 
be substantial, Norway would in practice have little choice but to agree. Norwegian 
influence will most likely be strong when it comes to technical and practical coopera-
tion with Sweden and Finland, but much weaker in the political deliberations of the 
union prior to deployment (Udgaard 2006, 326).
Dependency would not be restricted to international operations, but could also 
be extended to include the capacity to carry out certain kinds of national military 
operation. The Norwegian and Swedish armed forces were discussing in early 2010 
whether it would be possible to have a single ammunition depot for the Archer artil-
lery system. It would save money, but also increase Norwegian reliance on S weden 
in a crisis, since Sweden would have the stocks of ammunition. Norway would 
therefore need assurances that the ammunition would be made available when 
needed (Anonymous 5 [interview], Klæboe 2010 [conversation]). Initially, Swedish 
officials told their Norwegian counterparts that delivery of ammunition from Sweden 
to Norway in a crisis would require an act of the Swedish parliament, which they 
were nonetheless confident would be forthcoming. The Norwegian officials were 
not satisfied, and wanted assurances that the ammunition would automatically be 
transferred to Norway on request (Anonymous 3 [conversation]).
The issue is presently the subject of negotiations, but demonstrates the sensitiv-
ity of cost-saving measures that create important dependencies. In Finland as well, 
defence officials stress the need for a guarantee that if the Nordic countries are to 
pursue common procurement, storage and maintenance of ammunition and military 
equipment, the arrangements will work at a time of crisis. To minimise dependency 
on others, Finland aims to retain a fairly broad capability to maintain equipment and 
supply its forces nationally (Tuominen 2010 [interview]).
Similar to the ammunition issue, should two or more Nordic states choose to 
maintain their heavy vehicles at locations in one country, the dependence of the 
country without a heavy vehicle maintenance capacity would obviously increase. 
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At the moment, the Swedish Armed Forces Logistics is maintaining components of 
Danish, Norwegian and Finnish main battle tanks (Swedish Armed Forces Logistics 
2010), a trend which is likely to include more components and perhaps whole ve-
hicles in the future (Diesen 2010 [conversation]). Sweden has a lot of surplus main-
tenance capacity, and it could easily be adapted for maintaining heavy vehicles used 
by the Norwegian and Finnish Army (Mörtberg 2010 [interview], Diesen 2010 
[conversation]). It would allow both Norway and Finland to downscale their heavy 
vehicle maintenance facilities, and send their main battle tanks and infantry fighting 
vehicles to Sweden for repairs and maintenance. However, again, this would create 
a dependence on Sweden. Would vehicles being maintained or upgraded in Sweden 
be returned on request in a crisis? And would vehicle overhaul be possible if the 
international climate deteriorated, such as during a long-lasting international crisis?
In the end, few Nordic officials see these dependencies as seriously damaging, 
emphasising instead the positive security policy benefits of being able to maintain a 
wider set of military capabilities.27 However, cooperation, they all stress, is funda-
mentally based on trust; countries must have confidence that in a time of crisis capa-
bilities and resources which are no longer purely national will be available for use.28 
At the moment there is such confidence, but it is inevitably fragile. As the former 
Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir sees the Nordic 
countries, ‘It’s a bit like your family – you don’t always agree with them, but they’re 
there if anything happens’ (Ágústsson 2009, 41). Continuing to build on this kind 
of mutual trust and understanding is essential to the continued wellbeing of ongoing 
and future Nordic defence cooperation.

The Nordic armed f orces: 
ideal or incompatible 
p artners?
As demonstrated in chapter 3, the Nordic states see things differently on matters 
of regional security. However, this does not mean that their armed forces are neces-
sarily incompatible partners. According to the Norwegian Armed Forces, successful 
international military cooperation requires ‘that the cooperating countries [armed 
forces] should mainly be directed towards the same types of tasks, ambitions, equip-
ment and defence concepts’ (Norwegian Chief of Defence 2007, 63). In short, they 
have to be a good ‘fit’ for one another. To what extent then do the armed forces of 
the Nordic states ‘fit’ together? Are they a good match, or are the differences so great 
as to prove a real obstacle to cooperation?
As we shall see, in some ways the Nordic armed forces are more similar today 
than during the Cold War, but in others they are also more dissimilar than they used 
to be. Some of these differences and similarities clearly stem from their respective 
security outlooks and the geopolitical situation, but others are idiosyncrasies that are 
less predictable, less based on such factors, yet significant because they affect their 
ability to work together. So how well do the Nordic Armed Forces go together?
 Perhaps the best evidence of the Nordic armed forces being a good ‘match’ is 
the fact that it was the militaries themselves that pushed NORDEFCO into being 
in the first place. The initial push in late 2006 for a more extensive form of military 
cooperation among the Nordic countries came from the top of the military hierarchy 
in Norway and Sweden, i.e. the Chiefs of Defence General Sverre Diesen and Gen-
eral Håkan Syrén. They were joined later by their Finnish colleague, Admiral Pauli 
Juhani Kaskeala. A change of leadership in 2009 did not affect attitudes to NOR-
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DEFCO; Sweden’s General Sverker Göranson, Norway’s General Harald Sunde, and 
Finland’s General Ari Puheloinen all share their predecessors’ commitment to the 
organisation.29
 The Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs wrote in 2007 about how they saw a ‘great 
potential for cooperation’ between their two countries, including acquisition, up-
grading and training on materiel, as well as deploying and utilizing it in international 
operations (Diesen and Syrén 2007). The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration 
saw ‘geographical proximity’ and ‘the fact that the Nordic countries often participate 
in joint efforts’ giving Nordic cooperation ‘an extra large potential for savings’ com-
pared to other international partnerships (FMV 2010, 7). Indeed, conditions were 
much better for this type of cooperation now than during the Cold War, and not just 
because Sweden’s and Finland’s security policies were different.
With respect to the main weapon systems they employ, the Nordic armed 
forces are much more similar today than during the Cold War. In 1980 Norway 
and D enmark employed chiefly American and West-German main battle tanks, ar-
moured personnel carriers, artillery, aircraft, helicopters, and submarines. Sweden 
relied mostly on indigenous weapon systems, and Finland employed a mix of mostly 
Soviet, indigenous and some Swedish gear (IISS 1980, 31–32, 40–41, 48–49, 
46). Two decades latter this situation has changed dramatically, as illustrated by 
table 2.
Four of the Nordic countries now operate the same type of main battle tank and 
infantry fighting vehicle, and three of them operate similar armour personnel carri-
ers and transport aircraft. The decision by Norway, Sweden and Finland to acquire 
the same helicopter means that during the 2010s they will all come to operate the 
NH90, albeit in different roles. It will create wider equipment commonality. Such 
commonality, a Finnish report concluded, will create benefits in a ‘life cycle perspec-
tive’ and ‘its interoperability makes it highly suitable for international operations’ 
(Suila 2008, 14).
Other significant upcoming projects furthering commonality are the joint Nor-
wegian–Swedish acquisition of the Swedish self-propelled artillery system Archer, 
the Finish acquisition of the Norwegian surface-to-air missile system NASAM, and 
the Swedish decision to acquire the Finnish armoured personnel carrier Patria AMV 
(FMV 2009; IISS 2010, 2008; Dwyer 2009a).30 However, the biggest potential 
project would have been the Nordic acquisition of a common fighter aircraft. Both 
Norway and Denmark are poised to replace their F-16 fighter aircraft, and the Swed-
ish JAS Gripen, also operated by the Swedish Air Force, was one of the potential can-
didates. The Norwegian decision to go for the F-35 in November 2008 effectively 
scuttled the prospect of a ‘pan-Nordic’ fighter aircraft (O’Dwyer 2008; Office of the 
Norwegian Prime Minister 2008). In April 2009, Denmark postponed the decision, 
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though the F-35 is considered by observers to be a favourite of the Danish as well 
(Norwegian News Agency 2009).
Off course, the Nordic states operate slightly different versions of the weapon 
systems they have in common, tuned to their national requirements. This causes 
problems for joint maintenance, upgrading and system training. For this reason, 
some are urging to eliminate these national differences. For instance, the Norwegian 
Chief of Defence argued that Norway should purchase the Swedish version of the 
Leopard 2 (Dalløkken 2009). In the long run, however, such national idiosyncrasies 
on equipment acquisition will only be overcome if the Nordic armed forces manage 
to come up with common requirements and standards, and succeed in acquiring 
and upgrading systems accordingly.31 This will not necessarily be easy, or, in some 
cases, even desirable. In order to procure the same equipment, ‘countries will have 
to compromise on their demands and expectations’ (NORDSUP 2008b, 2). The 
Nordic armed forces will have to settle for ‘good enough’ rather than equipment 
‘tailor-made’ to their specific requirements.32
However, equipment harmonisation is not the be-all and end-all of Nordic co-
operation. Even where the equipment parks of the Nordic armed forces are identical, 
they would still have very different force structures and assigned tasks, significant 
challenges both. These differences are largely new, unheard of two decades ago. In 
1980, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland all had huge inactive reserve forces 
numbering 10–20 times their active forces, to be manned by former conscripts in 
wartime. Conscripts also made up between 1/3 to 3/4 of their active personnel (IISS 
1980, 31–32, 40–41,48–49, 46). These huge forces, potentially numbering more 
than 10 per cent of the population of the Nordic countries, where mostly designed 
for relatively static territorial defence tasks, and were neither organisationally nor le-
gally suitable for projection across large strategic distances before engaging in battle 
(Yost 2000–01, 99–100).
The picture today is radically different, particularly with regard to the Nordic 
land forces. Starting in 2010 Sweden will have an all-volunteer force (Swedish 
Ministry of Defence 2009a, 75–81; see also Petersson 2010b, 148–155). The 
Swedish government is emphatic that the Swedish Armed Forces must be capable 
of performing across the full range of military missions on Swedish territory, as well 
as regionally and globally, alone or jointly with others (Swedish Ministry of Defence 
2009a, 33–38). The new force structure is described by the Swedish Armed Forces 
as ‘expeditionary’ and ‘modular’ in character, while its reduced size makes it less 
capable of defending Swedish territory from attack (Swedish Armed Forces Head-
quarters 2008, 20–23). Several standing, all-volunteer battalions will be set up un-
der the Swedish Army. They will be supplemented by several all-volunteer battalions 
manned at reduced strength, but which can be rapidly brought up to full strength 
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by mobilising reservists. In total there will be eight manoeuvre battalions, capable of 
being subordinated at need to two brigade headquarters. The Air Force will have four 
fighter squadrons equipped with JAS-39 C/D fighter aircraft, while the main combat 
strength of the Navy will be seven corvettes, five Visby class and two Göteborg class, 
as well as four submarines of the Gotland/Sondermanland classes (Swedish Ministry 
of Defence 2009a, 45–72; Olsen 2010a, 15). In 2010, a universal obligation to 
serve on missions abroad was de facto introduced for all regular members of the 
Swedish Armed Forces (Holmström 2010).
The Danish Armed Forces place more emphasis on high-intensity coalition 
warfare far from Danish territory, seeking since 2003 to be capable of providing 
robust and combat-capable ‘initial entry force’ for NATO and/or US-led coalitions 
regionally and globally (Bruun 2003, 34–36). In order to produce these deployable 
forces Denmark has retained since 2004 an essentially all-volunteer force (Dan-
ish Ministry of Defence 2004). While thousands of Danish draftees annually still 
undergo a short four-month ‘total defence’ training programme, it works primarily 
as a way to recruit personnel for the all-volunteer units (Heurlin 2006, 166–171). 
The Danish Army is divided in principle into two mechanized brigades, one being 
a standing rapid reaction brigade, the other maintaining Denmark’s ongoing mis-
sions abroad. Air Force combat strength consists of two fighter squadrons with F-16 
AM aircraft, while the Navy’s major surface vessels count three Iver Huitfeldt class 
frigates now being constructed, as well as two flexible support ships of the Absalon 
class. The latter are capable of transporting 200 extra soldiers, are equipped with 
a role-on-role of platform, and can provide naval fire support up to 100km inland 
(Nørby 2006, 46–49, 124–129, 169–171, 182–201). Since 1994, it has been 
possible to order all regular armed forces personnel to serve abroad when needed 
(Clemmesen 1995, 128).
 Norway occupies an intermediate position between Denmark and Sweden on 
the on hand, and Finland on the other. While most of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
have been available in principle for international deployment since 2002, including 
Norway’s only remaining brigade since 2004, the retention of long-term conscrip-
tion means that many units are only employable nationally (Norwegian Chief of De-
fence 2003, 10).33 At home, the Norwegian Armed Forces aim to have sufficient 
national capacity to force any opponent to employ such force against Norway as 
to trigger NATO’s involvement, turning the conflict into a collective alliance de-
fence mission (Norwegian Chief of Defence 2007, 5–6; Norwegian Defence Pol-
icy Commission 2007, 33–36; Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 18–19, 37–38; 
Diesen 2008a). To do this the Norwegian Armed Forces draft 10,000 conscripts a 
year for a twelve-month term of service, making two out of three of the Norwegian 
Army’s manoeuvre battalions dependent on conscripts who cannot be ordered to 
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serve abroad (Sætre 2010).34 However, the Norwegian Army also has a number of 
all-volunteer units. One mechanized battlegroup makes up an all-volunteer Army 
High Readiness Force. The Air Force fields three fighter squadrons equipped with 
F-16 AM aircraft, while the Navy’s major vessels are to be five Fridtjof Nansen class 
frigates, six Ula class submarines, and six Skjold class coastal corvettes (Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence 2008, 70–90). Since 2004, it has been possible to order offic-
ers, NCOs and professional enlisted soldiers to serve abroad (Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence 2004, 80–82).
Finland is the country whose armed forces are geared more strongly than the 
others’ towards national tasks, setting it apart from the other Nordic states (see e.g. 
Sallinen 2007). Even if the threat of a military conflict is seen as low, Finland as 
the only Nordic country still identifies ‘military capacities’ in its region (i.e. Russia) 
whose deterrence can only be achieved by raising the conflict threshold to an unac-
ceptable level for a potential adversary (Heurlin 2007c, 47–48). Finnish defence 
policy therefore continues to be ‘based on a robust defence system implemented in 
accordance with territorial defence principles, general conscription and a strong will 
to defend the nation’ (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009b, 107). What territo-
rial defence means in practice is ‘to engage the aggressor at the border and prevent 
him from reaching strategically vital areas’ (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009b, 
110). In order to do this the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) train about 25,000 
conscripts annually, with another 25,000 undergoing refreshment training (Finnish 
Defence Forces 2008, 6). The wartime strength of the FDF land forces is eleven 
brigades and two battlegroups. The bulk of these forces is inactive reserve units. 
The Air Force consists of 3 fighter squadrons equipped with F-18 C/D aircraft, and 
the Navy fields eight fast patrol crafts, four each of the Hamina and Rauma class. 
The total strength of the FDF upon mobilisation is 350,000 troops (Finnish Prime 
Minister’s Office 2009a, 127). Finland is the only Nordic country where military 
personnel, even regular soldiers and officers, cannot by default be ordered to serve 
abroad (Vesa 2007, 529–534).
At a glance the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish armed forces share a structure 
which is more similar in size than that of Finland. Apart from this, the main differ-
ences between the Nordic states is that the Swedish Air Force is about twice as large 
as its Nordic counterparts, and Norway and Denmark maintain a larger blue-water 
capable navy than do Finland and Sweden. Norway and Finland also man many of 
their standing units with undeployable conscripts, unlike Denmark and Sweden.
What are the implications of these structural similarities and dissimilarities? 
First, in terms of structure and tasks, the Swedish and Danish Armed Forces look 
very similar. The difference is one of emphasis, with Denmark more concerned with 
expeditionary warfare missions, and Sweden more with stability operations and re-
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gional tasks. The Norwegian military force structure is broadly similar to those of 
Denmark and Sweden, the only difference being in the sense that most units are 
manned with conscripts, and Norway is more concerned with national military crisis 
management missions than the other two. Finally, the Finnish Armed Forces is the 
‘odd man out’, with a structure and tasks very different from the others.
As pointed out earlier, armed forces with very different structures and tasks 
can be assumed to find cooperating difficult. Thus Finland and Denmark would 
make somewhat inapposite partners. On balance, Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
would probably have an easy time of cooperating given their compatible force struc-
tures. Despite Norway sharing some of Finland’s security concerns about Russia, 
the Norwegian military is still very different from the Finnish Armed Forces. Indeed, 
in several areas, a Norwegian report on defence cooperation concluded ‘[Norway 
and Finland] are too different, not least when it comes to the orientation of their de-
fence forces, membership of alliances, languages and differences in materiel’ (Dahl 
et al. 2007, 21). However, while most of the interviewed officials pointed to Fin-
land’s ‘differentness’ as a potential source of problems, none of those involved with 
NORDEFCO could point to any concrete episode were Finland’s dissimilar defence 
posture had caused a problem for cooperation. Denmark, however, was unfailingly 
viewed as having chosen to ‘opt out’ of most practical aspects of Nordic military 
cooperation.39
For the Danish Armed Forces and MoD, argues Peter Viggo Jakobsen, NATO is 
seen as ‘the only game in town’, with Nordic defence cooperation often seen in con-
sequence as a waste of time (Jakobsen 2006, 219). NORDCAPS used to be seen 
TABLE 3: Nordic Armed Forces Structure compared (2010). (Source: Danish Ministry of 
Defence 2009; Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2008; Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009a; 
Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009a; Danish Ministry of Defence 2009; IISS 2010.)
Armed Forces Dan Nor Swe Fin
Brigades 2 1 2 11
Frigates35 3 5 - -
Corvettes/MTBs36 - 6 7 8
Submarines - 6 4 -
Fighter aircraft 30 48 100 60
Transport aircraft37 4 4 8 3
Transp. Helicopters38 14 18 18 20
Home Guard 50 000 45 000 22 000 -
Total troops numbers 76 000 69 000 50 000 350 000
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as at best ‘a way of helping Finland and Sweden into NATO and Norway into the 
EU’ and at worst ‘a duplication of capabilities established within NATO’ (Jakobsen 
2006, 219). As Magnus Christiansson contends, comparing Denmark to Sweden, 
‘while Sweden uses its international missions and operations to score points on 
the international arena, Denmark has figured out which actors to receive these points 
from on the international arena’ (Christiansson 2009, 11–12). The desired partners 
are identified as the US and the UK, and deploying abroad alongside less capable 
partners should be avoided (Danish Armed Forces 2007, 13; Rasmussen 2009, 
15). As a consequence, says Bertel Hurlin, Denmark is ‘over-fulfilling its obligations 
towards NATO’ and has cooperates closely with the United States on security and 
defence (Heurlin 2007c, 48–49). The United Kingdom has also been a key partner, 
particularity to the Danish Army (Frantzen 2005, 155–158; Nørby 2006, 44–46). 
The aforementioned Norwegian report sees Denmark and Norway as sharing many 
military and political similarities, but ‘a challenge for Norway will be to identify areas 
that can attract Danish attention’ and to induce Denmark into tighter military coop-
eration (Dahl et al. 2007, 26).
Danish defence officials would like to cooperate more with their Nordic partners, 
they stress, but such cooperation has to make clear economic sense to them from 
the get-go. While Norway and Sweden seem willing to invest in cooperation merely 
from the conviction that money will be saved down the line, Danes are unwilling to 
commit to a project unless it proves superior to doing it in other forums, and better 
or at least no worse than doing it alone (Fisher 2010 [interview]; Rasmussen 2010 
[interview]; Bille 2010 [interview]). Also, it would clearly help if Danish soldiers were 
deployed alongside other Nordic soldiers again, as the Danish Armed Forces need 
to prioritise interoperability and cooperation with the partners they are currently de-
ployed alongside (for now, Britain). While larger partners than the Nordics have the 
disadvantage that Denmark is not an equal partner, they at least can offer many 
assets and capabilities on which Denmark can draw in international operations, and 
which the Nordic countries cannot provide (Bille 2010 [interview]).
Nevertheless, Denmark and Norway do cooperate closely on fighter aircraft 
under the European Participating Air Forces Expeditionary Air Wing (see Paulsen 
2007, 8–9), as well as through NATO. For example, air-policing of Norwegian and 
Danish airspace is handled by NATO’s Integrated Air Defence System, aircraft being 
directed from the Combined Air Operations Centre at Finnerup, Denmark (NATO 
2001, 185–187; NATO – Allied Command Operations 2010b; NATO – Allied 
Command Operations 2010a). Also, on low-level, practical day-to-day activities, 
e.g. sending company sized units on exercises abroad, Denmark works seamlessly 
with the other Nordic countries (Bille 2010 [interview]).
‘From a position on NATO’s semi-periphery,’ Nikolaj Petersen argues, ‘D enmark 
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has moved to the core with every intention of staying there’ (Petersen 2001, 293). 
The risk for Denmark lies in its particular attachment to the transatlantic partner-
ship being endangered by Nordic cooperation. While Denmark and Iceland both 
were positive to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq (Jóhannesson 2004, 130), Denmark 
was the only Nordic state to support the US invasion with combat forces (Mouritzen 
2006, 497–498; see also Mouritzen 2007). Would that have been more difficult 
if Denmark had been more reliant upon co-located or shared Nordic assets? And 
would its forces be as apt for expeditionary warfighting in southern Afghanistan if 
they were harmonised with the other Nordic forces, with less of a focus on expe-
ditionary warfighting alongside the United States and the United Kingdom?40 In 
September 2007, when Denmark and Norway were urged by some of their par-
liamentarians to ‘pool’ their F-16 aircraft and save on maintenance and operating 
costs, the idea was given short shrift by the Danish and the Norwegian ministers for 
defence; they were concerned about their governments’ freedom of action (Langballe 
2007; Langballe and Klarskov 2007). Apart from legal considerations, the fact that 
Norway and Denmark had chosen different paths on Iraq, and different types of en-
gagements in Afghanistan, was perhaps not lost on them (see Saxi 2010b, 47–51).
Second, limited resources will constrain how much Nordic cooperation and har-
monisation Finland and Denmark can partake in. The idea of harmonisation of na-
tional defence structures is anathema to Finland; Finland does not want to abandon 
its defence system based on territorial defence and national conscription (Forsberg 
and Vaahtoranta 2001, 73). This puts a clear upper limit on the homogenisation 
of the Nordic armed forces; it would simply not be possible to bring the vast bulk of 
Finland’s wartime forces up to the equipment and training standards required. Al-
though Finland increased defence spending by 16 per cent in 2009, responding to 
the 2008 Russian–Georgian War, the purchasing power of the FDF is under pres-
sure (IISS 2010, 117). The FDF will therefore probably continue to be an important 
exception to the general Nordic trend towards similarity in main weapon systems; 
the Finnish regional forces, the artillery branch, and parts of the mechanized forma-
tions will remain equipped with Cold War era Soviet gear for the foreseeable future 
(IISS 2010, 182–183).
The last time Finland could afford sufficient stocks of equipment to rearm most 
of its ground forces, was in the early 1990s. But that was when nearly the entire 
armoury of the former German Democratic Republic was sold off at bargain prices 
by the newly unified German state (Raunio 1996, 63–64). Such historical events 
are unlikely to be repeated, and in any case would not further the homogenisation 
and NATO interoperability of the Nordic land forces. In practice, Finnish defence 
officials admit, the core of the ground forces now comprises the three readiness 
brigades and the two mechanized battlegroups (Toveri 2010 [interview]; Sallinen 
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2010 [interview]). These units have received the bulk of all new equipment acqui-
sitions over the last few years, although, starting in 2012, the regional forces are 
slated to enjoy priority (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009b, 116).
Despite the Finnish government’s aim of achieving an annual 2 per cent real 
increase in defence appropriations (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009a, 117, 
125), Finland’s resource constraint will require it be very selective about which 
Nordic materiel projects to get involved in; shortage of resources will be a major 
constraint on Finnish participation in NORDEFCO (Tuominen 2010 [interview]). 
For example, it would be fiscally impossible for Finland to replace its more than 
1,000 artillery pieces with the Swedish Archer system. This is unlike the situation 
in S weden and Norway, where entire older stocks of artillery can be phased out in 
favour of Archer as they only require 24 self-propelled artillery systems each.41 Simi-
larly, only parts of the FDF land forces will be able to reach the new ‘Nordic’ stand-
ardisation aimed for under the Nordic mechanized battalion scheme, while Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark could probably reach this standard in all their mechanized 
units (Toveri 2010 [interview]).
From a resource point of view, Denmark also differs from the wider Nordic com-
munity in spending less on equipment. While Sweden and Finland spends over or 
close to 30 per cent and Norway more 20 per cent of their budgets on equipment 
acquisitions, Denmark spends barely 15 per cent (Nordlund, Åkerström, and Lusua 
2009, 48). From a resources point of view, Norway and Sweden therefore as appear 
to be perfectly matched; both spend generously on new equipment and infrastruc-
ture, but have relatively small organisations to modernise. Finland has the former, 
while Denmark has the latter. Demark nevertheless spends its more limited invest-
ments funds more efficiently, however, so the low investment level may be less of 
a problem than these statistics would indicate (see Norwegian Ministry of Defence 
2005).
 Finally, language and culture also plays a part in military-to-military coopera-
tion. Again, Finland (and Iceland) comes out as the more challenging partner for the 
other Nordic states; most Finnish personnel do not have a Scandinavian language as 
their first language. Finland has been trying to overcome this by employing NATO 
Standardization Agreements for procedures, systems and equipment components 
–  STANAGs – in all areas of cooperation, making English the lingua franca of coop-
eration. However, the language barrier remains a challenge to Scandinavian–Finnish 
cooperation (Tuominen 2010 [interview]).42
Iceland has the same problem with its Coast Guard and ICRU personnel, al-
though since they are such a marginal group in terms of military cooperation, it 
does not challenge Nordic cooperation much. Finnish military culture is, however, a 
challenge given the Finnish military’s greater emphasis on secrecy and formal proce-
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dures (Mörtberg 2010 [interview]). For example, Swedish and Norwegian exchange 
officers have experienced problems gaining access to high-level officials and certain 
information in the Finnish Defence Command. They are also circumscribed in their 
interaction with their national defence attachés in Helsinki (Anonymous 1 [conver-
sation]; Anonymous 2 [conversation]). The contrast to the Oslo-based Swedish ex-
change officer is striking; he was integrated into the Norwegian Ministry of Defence 
almost as a ‘normal’ official. Indeed, he was entrusted with the task of formulating 
with another official the Norwegian Armed Force Joint Operations Doctrine 2007.43
 So just how compatible are the Nordic Armed Forces? Unsurprisingly, the 
Swedish and Norwegian forces, the original instigators of NORDEFCO, come out 
as the best ‘fit’ of the four. They share many similar main weapon systems, broadly 
similar armed forces structures and tasks, decent resources-to-force structure ratios, 
and mostly similar language and cultures.44 The 2007 report on Norwegian–Swed-
ish military cooperation concluded that the ‘Norwegian and Swedish Armed Forces 
are mainly directed at the same tasks, ambitions and defense concepts’ and that 
therefore ‘cooperation on force generation can cover the entire breadth of national 
force structures’ (Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence 2007, 2). Finland, 
while a dedicated member of NORDEFCO, is hampered by its large structure, which 
is fiscally nearly impossible to modernize, and different task orientation. The Finnish 
language, so different from the other Scandinavian languages, and, to a lesser extent, 
Finland’s military culture, is also a challenge to cooperation.
Finally, the Danish Armed Forces would appear be a good match for Sweden 
and Norway; Denmark’s chief problem is perhaps the low level of investment in 
new equipment. However, the Danes are generally not very interested in Nordic 
cooperation, which makes them unavailable as a partner for the other Nordic states. 
The Danish Armed Forces have chosen to address their lack of resources and critical 
mass problems by cutting whole capacities rather than cooperating with others, thus 
giving them the ‘luxury’ of staying on the fringe of NORDEFCO at the moment. The 
core of NORDEFCO, if one is to judge by compatibility of the Nordic armed forces, 
is therefore likely to remain Sweden and Norway, with Finland as a dedicated, if 
selective, third partner.

The domestic factor:  
Who gets what, where,  
when and how?
The most legitimate arguments for and against international military cooperation 
deal with the consequences to national security, as variously detailed in the pre-
ceding perspectives. However, the most serious challenge to Nordic cooperation is 
perhaps more likely to be related to domestic rather than international politics. It is the 
question of political will to make unpopular decisions, such as reducing the number 
of armed forces bases or the size of the national defence industry, in order to realise 
the potential gains of Nordic cooperation.45 There is also a question of how hard 
the countries will bargain when the distribution of gains takes place, and how party 
politics and the challenge of bringing to bear the necessary bureaucratic resources to 
participate in cooperation will be handled. As we shall see, these issues are tightly 
interlinked.
Burden sharing is normally very challenging for countries in close partnerships 
and alliances. For NATO it has been perhaps the most divisive issue in its history 
(Sandler and Hartley 1999, 23). The 2008 NORDSUP progress report foreshad-
ows a potential distributional problem, pointing out that ‘cooperation implies trade-
offs between costs and benefits’ and the Nordic states must be ‘ready to cut down on 
their base, support and logistics structures, acquiring or exchanging these services 
with the other nations’ (NORDSUP 2008b, 2). If and when Nordic cooperation 
advances far enough, there will be bases, jobs, industrial contracts, weapons de-
velopment projects and acquisition costs to be distributed among the participating 
countries. While there is undeniable support for Nordic cooperation at the abstract 
political level, one can legitimately ask whether this support will endure when coop-
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eration reaches the concrete and specific. ‘While everyone favours Nordic coopera-
tion on a general level,’ ponders Thorvald Stoltenberg, ‘they tend to become petty 
when descending to a concrete level’ (Kullin 2009, 34).
One example of this challenge is to expand joint training programmes for the 
shrinking Nordic officer corps. ‘The most difficult question related to a possible 
merger of the Nordic defence universities’, writes Colonel Bjørn Innset, ‘would pos-
sibly be where to base the new institution’ (Innset 2010, 23). Basing personnel out-
side national territory can be expensive, with some parts of the military organisation 
‘losing’ personnel and functions that are sent abroad (Klæboe 2010 [interview]). 
These types of question have yet to be addressed in detail, as the Finnish parlia-
mentarian and Social Democrat Erkki Tuomoja noted when he pointed out that the 
Stoltenberg report ‘says nothing about money or costs’ (Nordic Council 2009). The 
devil will be in the detail of who gets what, where, when and how. Should one country 
benefit significantly more than the others, even if all benefit to a degree, it could en-
danger the domestic legitimacy of the cooperative undertaking. The bargaining will 
therefore be a painful and agonising process, as countries vie to avoid the proverbial 
‘short end of the stick’.46 Lessons learned by Finland from the Swedish–Finnish Ad-
vanced Mortar System (AMOS) project can be illuminating in this respect.
After having participated in a joint project between Finnish Patria Vammas and 
Swedish Hagglunds to develop AMOS, Sweden withdrew without purchasing the 
system. To Finland’s surprise, the contract allowed Sweden to do this without pay-
ing any of the development costs of the system. Finland was left with almost the 
entire bill for developing the system, and Sweden was under no obligation to procure 
significant numbers of units (Sallinen 2010 [interview]). It is perhaps no accident 
that Finnish officials now stress the need for ‘iron-tight contacts’ for future Nordic 
cooperative ventures.47 They also want to see a clearer and more explicit distribution 
of costs and benefits. NORDEFCO could do with more long-term horse-trading, 
they insist, ensuring a fair ‘balance of payment’. If not, they will be hard to point 
to concrete benefits to Finland from the cooperation, while the ‘losses’, such as 
jobs and bases closed, will be all too apparent to NORDEFCO critics. More ex-
plicit linkages of costs and benefits would increase the ease with which cost-saving 
deals could be made among the Nordic states (Sallinen 2010 [interview]; Tuominen 
2010 [interview]).48
However, burden sharing will be a particular challenge for NORDEFCO, not 
just because it will involve the distribution of some relative gains for all involved, 
but because of a potentially massive negative impact on small, vulnerable local com-
munities. It will therefore be essential to overcome the well-entrenched ‘munici-
pality–military complex’. Historically, Swedish and Norwegian defence policies have 
been particularly influenced by regional employment policy, so much so that one 
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often speaks of a ‘municipality–military complex’ in these countries, consisting of lo-
cal base commanders, municipal and county politicians, and local business people, 
banding together to prevent the closure of military bases in rural parts of Norway and 
Sweden (Dörfer 2007, 132; Græger 2007, 50–52).
Knowing the strength of the municipality–military complex, General (Ret.) 
Sverre Diesen wondered whether Norwegian politicians really would support abol-
ishing a national heavy vehicle maintenance capacity, with corresponding loss of 
local jobs in rural communities, in order to move the jobs to Sweden (Diesen 2010 
[conversation]). Or, as Rear Admiral Jörgen Ericsson asked rhetorically, would Swed-
ish politicians accept the co-location of all the Nordic C-130 transport aircraft to 
one Nordic air base if that base was not in Sweden (Ericsson 2010 [interview]). 
These questions are as yet unanswered, because NORDEFCO has not proceeded 
far enough. How they are answered will be the real litmus test for whether signifi-
cant savings are possible by integrating and rationalising the support structure of the 
Nordic armed forces.
In Finland, the ‘municipality–military complex’ is also strong, but the issue is 
tied even closer to national security policy than in Sweden and Norway. Having 
local garrisons and units all over Finland creates a feeling of security in the popula-
tion, which makes it harder to rationalise the base structure of the Finnish Armed 
Forces. Public opinion would be hard-pressed to accept the closure of Finnish bases 
and to move some armed forces capabilities abroad, unless Finnish politicians could 
demonstrate clearly how it related to a Nordic-wide quid pro quo (Sallinen 2010 
[interview].
Denmark could be expected to have an easier time overcoming its municipal-
ity–military complex than the other Nordic states. With a much smaller territory, 
D enmark would presumably find it easier to maintain a less costly and more ‘ra-
tional’ base and force structure, since fewer vulnerable local communities rely on 
the armed forces as their main employer (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2005, 28; 
Nordlund, Åkerström, and Lusua 2009, 45). However, even in Denmark, the clo-
sure of local bases and the amalgamation of regiments would most likely be the most 
debated and unpopular aspects of any new Defence Agreement (Nørby 2006, 21).
Defence transformation in Norway and Sweden proved extremely challenging 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, and only slightly easier and quicker in Denmark 
(Haldén 2007; Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes 2004, 183–236; Saxi 2010b, 
29–60). Finland has yet to restructure the armed forces, despite widespread agree-
ment on the necessity of radically downsizing and restructuring the FDF.49 Because 
it deals with changes to the structure of the armed forces, NORDEFCO carries with 
it some of the same challenges associated with defence forces transformation. On 
the issue of Swedish defence transformation, one author wrote, ‘the single biggest 
64 OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
problem that the Armed Forces faced and will face […] is how to convince people that 
the changes are necessary and the future is positive’ (Neretnieks 2002, 318). The 
same could just as easily be applied to Nordic defence cooperation.
While the military leaderships of Norway, Sweden and Finland are united in 
their view that cooperation is necessary, if need be at the cost of bases and jobs 
moved abroad, such conviction is likely to be less clear at the lower levels of the mili-
tary hierarchy and in the general population. Political support for concrete proposals 
for Nordic defence cooperation could abate when faced with protests against unpop-
ular initiatives. Thus intra-Nordic bargaining may be significantly wing-clipped by a 
narrow ‘win-set’; in other words, the domestic constituencies, including the Nordic 
publics, voters, parliaments, labour unions, and affected municipalities, who will all 
eventually have a say in ‘ratifying’ the outcomes of bargaining within NORDEFCO, 
may turn out to have a much lower tolerance for some negotiated outcomes than the 
national defence leadership (see Putnam 1988).
NORDEFCO and the Stoltenberg Report will, however, seemingly not be sub-
ject to political vagaries in another sense, by being reliant on the outcome of Nordic 
election. To most officials involved in Nordic defence cooperation, the ballot box 
seems irrelevant; Nordic cooperation is so unanimously popular across the political 
spectrum in all the Nordic states that a change of government is believed to be of lit-
tle or no significance.50 Nordic cooperation is also incredibly popular with the Nordic 
public. An October 2010 poll found that nearly 80 per cent of Nordic citizens have 
a positive view of Nordic cooperation, and more than half wants more of it (Oxford 
Research 2010). There have even been serious suggestions to form a Nordic state, 
most recently from the Swedish historian Gunnar Wetterberg at a meeting of the 
Nordic Council of Ministers in Reykjavik in November 2010 (see also Wetterberg 
2009; Wetterberg 2010). 
However, a persuasive argument can nevertheless be made that the domestic 
political factor is more important than commonly presupposed. The outcomes of 
the 2005–07 general elections in Norway, Sweden, Finland all produced govern-
ments who were all more than ordinarily enthusiastic about Nordic cooperation, if 
for somewhat different reasons. Meanwhile, the 2007 general election in Denmark 
re-elected a government which was not very interested in the Nordic arena.
In Norway, the 2005 general election produced a Labour-dominated Centre-
Left coalition that included the Socialist Left Party, historically a staunch opponent of 
Norwegian NATO membership. For Norwegian NATO sceptics, Nordic cooperation 
had always been viewed as a favourable alternative to the transatlantic partnership 
(Dörfer 1997, 72). The year after, in 2006, the Swedish general election produced 
a Centre-Right coalition dominated by the Western-oriented Conservative Party, but 
which also included the divided Christian Democratic Party and pro-nonalignment 
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Centre Party. The government was therefore hamstrung on the NATO issue, but for 
Western-oriented Swedish politicians, Nordic cooperation, which necessarily had 
to include NATO members Denmark and Norway, has traditionally been seen as a 
way of aligning Sweden closer to the alliance (Kronvall and Petersson 2005, 43–45; 
Dörfer 1997, 72). The 2007 Finnish election then allowed the pro-nonalignment 
Centre Party to remain in government, but only by replacing its Centre-Left coalition 
with the Social Democratic Party with a Centre-Right coalition including the Con-
servatives. Both the Foreign Minister and Minister for Defence came from the Con-
servatives, and were openly supportive of Finnish NATO membership (Steinbock 
2008, 204–206). The Social Democratic President remained, however, wholly op-
posed (Meinander 2006, 242–245).
In Norway, Nordic partnership was hence popular in the government because it 
allowed for ‘non-NATO’ military cooperation, while the Swedish and Finnish gov-
ernments’ strong support of Nordic cooperation can be seen as a way of aligning 
the countries closer to NATO while avoiding actual membership. Meanwhile, in 
D enmark, the re-election of the Centre-Right government of Anders Fogh Rasmus-
sen in 2007 meant that the Danish Social-Democratic Party, which was more en-
thusiastic about Nordic cooperation (and UN peacekeeping) than the Danish Liber-
als and Conservatives (Jakobsen 2010 [conversation]), remained in opposition. A 
favourable political climate on the Nordic path was thus probably a contributing fac-
tor to Norway, Sweden and Finland leading the way towards a common Nordic de-
fence arrangement. But if this favourable political constellation were to change, the 
impact on Nordic cooperation could be larger than foreseen by many practitioners.
Another domestic factor of importance for NORDEFCO’s development, al-
though more international than the ‘municipality–military complex’ and national 
electoral politics, is the ‘military–industrial complex’, i.e. the defence industry of the 
Nordic states. Armaments manufacturers differ from ‘normal’ businesses by fre-
quently being considered vital to national security, as well as needing government aid 
and protection. The former Norwegian Minister of Defence 2005–09, Anne-Grete 
Strøm-Erichsen, represents the typical view of government-defence industry rela-
tions: ‘Our defense industry can only remain in the technological lead if it is inter-
nationally engaged, and given the nature of the international defense industry, this 
requires a strong partnership between government and industry’ (O’Dwyer 2009e).
The major Nordic weapons manufacturers in 2008 were the Swedish compa-
nies Saab ($3 billion in arms sales) and BAE Systems Hägglunds ($670 million), 
the Finnish Patria ($670 million), and the Norwegian Kongsberg Gruppen ($540 
million). Together these companies employed more than 22,000 people across the 
Nordic countries and abroad, about half of them Saab employees. With the ex-
ception of Kongsberg Gruppen, which derived only 40 per cent of its sales from 
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weapons, these companies derived more than 80 per cent or more of their income 
from the sale of armaments (Jackson 2010). In order to promote Nordic defence 
cooperation the Nordic countries will probably need some form of common defence 
industry strategy. At a very minimum, they will need national strategies which do not 
hamper the objectives set out for NORDEFCO. At the moment, this is not the case. 
Particularly the continued requirement for offset-purchases complicates Nordic co-
operation (Ericsson 2010 [interview]; Anonymous 5 [interview]). The NORDAC 
Agreement tried to limit the use of industrial offsets for intra-Nordic procurement, 
but with very limited success (Hagelin 2006, 173).
There are several differences between the Nordic defence industries which com-
plicates having a Nordic approach or strategy. First, there is the traditional fear of 
Sweden’s smaller neighbours that the more numerous and traditionally better-off 
Swedes will dominate joint undertakings. When the Scandinavian Airlines System 
was established in 1950, for example, Norwegians were worried that it would be 
de facto run by Sweden (Eriksen and Pharo 1997, 149–150). Such concerns are 
perhaps not fully unfounded when it comes to the arms industry, since Sweden’s ar-
maments industry is much larger than Norway’s or Finland’s, and significantly larger 
than Denmark’s. Any Nordic defence industry partnership will therefore be unbal-
anced, with Sweden standing to benefit the most from an intra-Nordic arms market.
While official Swedish policy no longer favours its national arms industry, and 
weapons will be purchased ‘off-the-shelf ’ based solely on military requirements, 
the government nevertheless remains closely involved with the industry (Swedish 
Ministry of Defence 2009a, 86–90).51 In 2010, a new Defence and Security Ex-
port Agency was established, to promote the sale of Swedish arms abroad, and the 
same year the government decided to domestically develop a new class of subma-
rines, of which at least two would be constructed. One reason was the need ‘to pre-
serve [Sweden’s] unique technical know-how’ in the submarine industry (Tolgfors 
2010b). That Finland and Norway are fearful that Nordic cooperation on defence 
might be a way for Sweden to develop a privileged market for Swedish weapons is 
not surprising (Toveri 2010 [interview]; Anonymous 3 [conversation]).
Second, the Swedish and Danish industries are mostly privately owned, while 
those of Norway and Finland are partly government owned. Patria is owned jointly 
by the state of Finland (73.2 per cent) and the European Aeronautic Defence and 
Space Company (EADS) (26.8 per cent), while the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and 
Industry owns the majority of the shares in Kongsberg Gruppen (50.001 per cent) 
(Patria 2010, 2; Kongsberg Gruppen 2010, 9). The small and privatised Danish 
arms industry has expressed worry that Nordic cooperation will disproportionally fa-
vour large government-owned manufactures (O’Dwyer 2010). Also, different own-
ership structures could complicate attempts by Nordic arms manufactures to merge 
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or form close partnerships, as governments will have a huge influence on company 
structures.
Third, and perhaps the greatest challenge, the Nordic states do not really form 
an intra-Nordic arms market, since outside suppliers provide about 70–80 per cent 
of the weapons imported into the Nordic states. As a result, the Nordic armament 
partnership is not the most important source of trade for any of the countries in-
volved (Hagelin 2006, 167–178). The most important Nordic arms trade rela-
tionship is the Swedish–Norwegian one, where each takes about 20–25 per cent 
of the other’s exports. In addition, Sweden and Finland have close defence indus-
trial relations, with significant joint Swedish–Finnish partnerships, such as Patria 
H ägglunds, being large arms exporters (Hagelin 2006, 167–173). Thus common 
or joint procurement should be easiest to achieve for Norway, Sweden and Finland, 
as should joint or common maintenance of and support for identical equipment in 
the national inventories. This is not to say that it will be easy however.
In a long-term industrial view, a unified but secluded Nordic arms market is 
probably neither realistic nor independently viable. The Nordic states will ultimately 
be better served by developing their industry as part of a wider European defence 
industry market, but using the Nordic framework as a supplement. It can thus help 
Sweden remain one of the top five or six arms manufacturers in Europe, giving Nor-
way and Finland a medium-sized partner, and gaining some protection from the 
asymmetrical relationship from the much larger continental European and US firms 
(Brzoska 2006).
Finally, perhaps some of the strongest arguments levelled against NORDEFCO 
concern the time spent travelling to and from meetings, partaking in working groups, 
and hours spent preparing for these activities. Some have argued that the cost in 
money and time simply doesn’t justify the results. There is in other words a fear that 
NORDEFCO could become a drain on ministry and armed forces resources, with-
out providing sufficient returns to justify the effort. In addressing this criticism, the 
Nordic Chiefs of Defence emphasise the need to avoid the over-bureaucratisation 
of NORDEFCO; ‘we need concrete results’ argues Norway’s General Harald Sunde, 
‘not bureaucracy, meetings and travelling’ (Langvik-Hansen 2010). General Sverker 
Göranson, his Swedish counterpart, has given a similar message to his subordinates: 
NORDEFCO has to demonstrate its ability to deliver results now, rather than only 
promise future gains (Anonymous 5 [interview]; Hård af Segerstad 2010 [interview]; 
Ericsson 2010 [interview]).
In Finland and Denmark there is increasing concern for a bloated bureaucracy. 
Compared to Sweden’s and Norway’s, the Finnish and Danish Armed Forces have 
relatively fewer high-ranking staff officers. Sweden had 1,347 officers of lieutenant 
colonel rank or higher in the late 2000s, and Norway 925, Finland only possessed 
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449 officers at this rank, and Denmark only 411 (Swedish Defence Administration 
Inquiry 2005, 113). Denmark thus has the fewest high-ranking officers to spare, 
but there again the country only takes part in a limited number of NORDEFCO ac-
tivities. The ambition to participate fully would be challenging to achieve for Finland, 
and a potential challenge for Denmark, especially when it comes to taking part in 
the myriad working groups and decision-making bodies under the Nordic defence 
umbrella. The Finns have therefore advocated lowering the number of such groups, 
concentrating on fewer, and lowering the rank-level of their members (Toveri 2010 
[interview]). The Danes also emphasise what they view as a tremendously positive 
effect of forming NORDEFCO, namely the significant reduction in the number of 
working groups and potential projects compared to its predecessor organisations 
(Bille 2010 [interview]).
The Nordic countries have agreed to cut the number of groups, and focus on 
the ones generating results. While this might limit the potential breadth of coopera-
tion, the Nordic states are not aiming to cooperate on everything, just in such areas 
where cooperation makes the most sense and can yield the best result (Hård af 
Segerstad 2010 [interview]). The new NORDEFCO organisation has fewer work-
ing groups and decision-making forums, has more senior decision-makers, and is 
more integrated with the national chain of command of the member states than its 
predecessors. Therefore, it is hoped, it will be capable of making and implementing 
decisions faster and with greater ease. It is also hoped it will foster a more unified 
‘NORDEFCO culture’, replacing the more fractionised attitudes which sometimes 
developed between the participants in the predecessor organisations.52
How then does a domestic perspective on NORDEFCO add up? One answer is 
that political leaders will have to be willing to make potentially unpopular decisions 
about closing down jobs and bases, and possess the persuasive skills to explain 
what is happening to the Nordic publics and why. Favourable political constellations 
will also help: Centre-Left governments in Norway and Denmark, combined with 
Centre-Right governments in Sweden and Finland, would be the most fortuitous 
for NORDEFCO. Also, abandoning the requirements for offset-purchase on intra-
Nordic weapons deals, and possibly abandoning national industrial champions in 
favour of larger Nordic or European entities, would facilitate cost-effective coopera-
tion. Finally, avoiding the danger of bureaucratisation is a key requirement. Partici-
pating countries have to see that their ‘output’ from cooperation is greater than their 
‘input’. This means shutting down institutions that fail to produce results, limiting 
meetings and travelling, and keeping the number and seniority of officials involved 
as low as possible. If most or all of these domestic variables are met in the Nordic 
countries in the coming decades, it will facilitate the growth of effective Nordic de-
fence cooperation.
Conclusion and summary
This study began by asking why and how the Nordic states sought to strengthen 
cooperation in the security and defence field, and whether they are likely to succeed. 
Ultimately, the conclusion is that the Nordic countries are not prepared to assume 
full collective responsibility for Nordic security, but the Nordic framework does pro-
vide an attractive avenue for technical-military cooperation designed to deal with the 
interconnected challenges of flat defence budgets, rising defence equipment costs, 
increasingly demanding international missions, and shrinking armed forces struc-
tures in danger of going below ‘critical mass’.
 As we have seen, the historical record of Nordic defence cooperation is not 
encouraging. Historically inclined academics with an interest in NORDEFCO and 
the Stoltenberg Report have therefore generally been sceptical about what to expect 
from the process. Krister Wahlbäck finds few examples over the past 150 years 
where the Nordic have managed to stand united in the face of adversity (Wahlbäck 
2010), and according to Clive Archer, ‘every report on or move towards Nordic 
cooperation since 1948 which has dipped its toe into that pond has drawn back 
from taking the plunge’ (Archer 2010a, 14). From an institutional point of view, the 
unequal memberships of European security organisations have also been seen as 
challenge to Nordic cooperation. In the opinion of Magnus Petersson, Nordic coop-
eration risks becoming a competitor to NATO and the EU, the very organisations it 
explicitly aims to compliment (Petersson 2010c; 2010a). At the very least, varying 
membership in European security organisations could make Nordic interstate coop-
eration on ‘high politics’ security issues difficult.
From a regional perspective, the Nordic states clearly do not agree on which 
challenges and threats they are facing in their own region. To Copenhagen the chal-
lenges and threats are de-territorialised, and could come from anywhere, but typi-
cally far away. Sweden shares this threat perception, with a caveat for Russian power 
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in the Baltic Sea. Norway is concerned about its High North region and R ussia, but 
also feels the need to employ resources to deal with global challenges and threats. 
F inland, like Norway, is simultaneously concerned with its shared border with 
R ussia, as well as the challenges of globalisation, but Finnish defence efforts are 
markedly concentrated on the former. Finally, Iceland is chiefly concerned about 
non-military challenges in its vicinity, such as environmental disasters, but remains 
also wary of the possibility of a ‘scramble for the arctic’, which would make more tra-
ditional military threats once again an issue. Such different views do not lend easily 
to Stoltenberg’s urging ‘the Nordic countries [to] assume collective responsibility for 
their own security’ (Stoltenberg 2009a, 11). Almost the only thing the Nordic states 
do agree on is their shared desire not to sub-regionalise security; keeping NATO and 
the EU interested in the region is a key objective for all of them.
Considering these challenges, what would be required of NORDEFCO to nev-
ertheless become a success? Perhaps the key lesson from past attempts at Nor-
dic security cooperation is that undertakings which aim at having the Nordic states 
jointly and autonomously solve security challenges in their own region should not be 
pursued. While tremendously popular in the abstract, such initiatives have tended 
to ultimately prove unsuccessful when attempts are made to implement them. There 
is little indication that the outcome would be much different today. What may work, 
however, is incremental and functional cooperation on cutting costs and giving the 
Nordic states a greater ‘bang for their buck’ in world politics. Such efforts will be 
greatly helped by the strong political support for closer Nordic cooperation, and 
should strive to present itself as chiefly about ‘technical cooperation’ to save money 
and deliver more operational effect, thus drawing on the strong Nordic legacy of suc-
cessful cooperation in the practical sphere.
The practical approach of direct military-to-military cooperation, following the 
initiative taken by the Nordic Chiefs of Defence in 2006, is just such an effort. 
It starts on the technical side, envisioning common research, acquisition, educa-
tion, training, and possibly international deployment. Aiming to increase the military 
power available to each Nordic state, it nevertheless promises to maintain nationally 
autonomous operational capabilities and thus maintain the national freedom of ac-
tion (Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence 2007). Similar principles informed 
many of the proposals of the Stoltenberg Report. For instance, running co-located or 
joint diplomatic and consular missions could increase the global diplomatic presence 
of the Nordic states, and, perhaps, also their diplomatic clout, while saving money 
(Stoltenberg 2009b, 26–27).
This does not, however, at least not in theory, presuppose close cooperation 
of the Nordic states on foreign and security policy; the Nordic armed forces are to 
remain separate entities capable of autonomous action. Such pragmatic initiatives 
would therefore have the added value of having the best chance of including the 
711/2011 Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War
entire Nordic family, since most such undertakings would not run counter to the 
vital interests of any one Nordic state. While cooperation on procurement, training 
and education would always create some dependencies with security implications 
(Innset 2010), it should be possible through careful negotiations to avoid the most 
dependency-creating outcomes. As Tuomas Forsberg argues, on an optimistic note: 
‘there is much to be done without breaking the taboo on alliance loyalty or mili-
tary nonalignment, as well as the independent ability for national defence’ (Forsberg 
2010, 136). Where costs can be saved without encroaching on too many opposing 
national interests, progress is to be expected.
From a military point of view the Nordic armed forces are also suitable part-
ners; there is much equipment commonality among them, geographical proximity 
makes day-to-day cooperation easier, and shared bureaucratic and military cultures 
facilitate partnerships. Denmark, Norway and Sweden also have somewhat similar 
force structures and share a common Scandinavian language, making cooperation 
among these three particularly feasible from a military perspective. Iceland would 
continue to be marginalised within a NORDEFCO focused on practical military-to-
military cooperation, but should the Icelandic government so desire the Icelandic 
Coast Guard and ICRU could possibly be given a role at the military level of the 
organisation.
The NORDSUP/NORDEFCO approach would be well in line with what is hap-
pening elsewhere in Europe, as increased cooperation on generating military power 
may in fact be becoming something of a European Zeitgeist at the moment. In No-
vember 2010, Britain and France signed an agreement on closer military coopera-
tion, including shared use of aircraft carriers, shared maintenance and training on 
the A400M transport aircraft, and joint research on nuclear technologies and satel-
lites. The two states nevertheless emphasised that their armed forces were to remain 
under sovereign control and capable of acting autonomously (Burns 2010). The 
Swedish–German ‘Ghent initiative’ launched the same month aimed to do likewise; 
save money by furthering European cooperation on generating military power. There 
were several similarities between these two initiatives and NORDEFCO. Further-
more, the Nordic states’ most important extra-European partner, the US, would 
be very positively inclined towards practical Nordic cooperation aimed primarily at 
enabling the Nordic states to generate more military capabilities from their defence 
budgets.
While cooperation on generating military power seems sensible from an interna-
tional point of view, there are potentially numerous domestic obstacles which need 
to be overcome. The distribution of jobs, bases and industrial contracts will need to 
be carefully handled by the political leadership, since they will inevitably come up 
against strong vested interests in all Nordic countries. Challenging two-level ne-
gotiations involving both domestic and international give-and-take bargaining will 
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have to be made (see Putnam 1988). It would also facilitate Nordic cooperation if 
pro-NATO parties on the right remained in government in Sweden and Finland, and 
paradoxically also if somewhat more NATO-sceptical and pro-Nordic and pro-UN 
parties on the Left governed Norway and Denmark.
Given time, a successful track record of incremental and pragmatic cooperation 
among the Nordic armed forces, or for that matter the Nordic foreign services, will in 
turn strengthen a shared sense of Nordic identity. The longer the cooperative struc-
tures are allowed to function without upheavals, the more established and ‘natural’ 
Nordic defence cooperation is likely to become (Kullin 2009, 60). Over time, this 
type of cooperation is likely to promote confidence-building and communication, 
further the common definition of problems, modify explicit behavioural standards, 
and encourage a common sense of identity among the Nordic defence practition-
ers who take part.53 It is probably no accident that those officers who work directly 
with NORDEFCO issues are much more positive towards Nordic cooperation than 
their peers; perhaps, as one Danish officer jokingly stated, one may speak about a 
‘Stockholm syndrome’ within NORDEFCO (Bille 2010 [interview])? Successful co-
operation could also in turn further ‘functional spillover’, as close cooperation in one 
area, for example force production, logistics or joint weapons acquisition, creates 
pressure to push integration further in other areas, for instance to establish common 
or joint units. The argument may become that in order to realise fully the potential 
gains from cooperation, the integration of the Nordic armed forces must proceed 
even further.54
Over the last few decades Nordic cooperation is said to have been losing ground 
to European and transatlantic partnerships (Stoltenberg 2009a, 9; Christensen 
2006). The EU has clearly surpassed ‘Norden’ (the North) in terms of functional 
cooperation on e.g. freedom of movement and common market, and NATO has 
replaced the Nordic grouping in the UN as the most important institution through 
which Nordic military forces are deployed on international operations. NORDEFCO 
could, however, reinvigorate some of the traditional aspects of practical Nordic co-
operation, this time in the military sphere. Since NATO and the EU are such large 
and heterogeneous organisations, countries within these organisations are coming 
together in small clusters to cooperate on generating military power. This has wid-
ened the ‘window of opportunity’ for the Nordic framework to generate ‘added value’ 
through cost-effective functional military cooperation. However, if Nordic defence 
cooperation is to be a success it must remain as an unequivocal complement to 
NATO and the CSDP, maintain its chief advantage of being small, nimble and ho-
mogeneous by being careful about accepting new members, and manage potential 
domestic opposition by delivering visible quid pro quos which benefit all participating 
countries equally.
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ENDNOTES
1. If Canada and the United States are included, the figure becomes 4.5 and 2.7 per cent respectively.
2. However, if what the Nordic countries spend on border guards plus civilian and economic defence (e.g. stockpi-
ling strategic materials) were also included, the Cold War figures would be higher. For example, the Finnish Cold 
War figure would arguably be about 2.1 per cent. (Juusti and Matthews 1990, 86).
3. The percentages are mine. They are based on figures listed, and may differ somewhat from official estimates. 
Population size, economy, military expenditure and military manpower are taken from IISS The Military Balance 
2010. The definition of military expenditure used here is either that of the national defence budget or NATO 
definition of defence expenditure, depending on availability, and figures are from 2008. For Iceland, ‘military 
spending’ and ‘active troops’ represents the Icelandic Coast Guard. Territory represents the most up to date 
figures available from The World Factbook (2010).
4. In Sweden this objective will only be reached by 2019, but from 2014 the number should be about 1,700 
troops.
5. ‘Critical mass’ is a contended term, but used the way that it is described here it has been a favourite of the Nor-
wegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence in the late 2000s, with international cooperation as the proposed solution 
to overcome this challenge (see Diesen 2005, 173-177; Syrén 2006, 48-52).
6. ‘High politics’ is usually defined as issues dealing with the security and survival of the state, whereas ‘low politics’ 
are all those ‘normal’ or ‘non-essential’ matters of no danger to the vital security interests of a state (e.g. trade and 
cultural issues).
7. In Sweden, the correct title is Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces (Överbefälhavaren), and in 
Finland literally Commander of the Defence Forces (puolustusvoimain komentaja). However, in the interest of 
simplicity, the NATO term Chief of Defence will be employed.
8. Iceland, having no armed forces of their own, will not take part in the military side of things, being chiefly repre-
sented at the policy side. Nevertheless, nearly all Nordic officials interviewed stress that as a Nordic country it 
was natural to include Iceland in NORDEFCO. In Norway it was also stressed that Iceland is a NATO country.
9. Presentation by Senior Adviser Trond Heimvik, Norwegian MoD, September 2010.
10. Note that the paragraph does not guarantee an ‘automatic’ military response, only ‘such action as it deems neces-
sary’ (Article 5), and that response is limited by member states’ ‘respective constitutional processes’ (Article 11).
11. For example, the US push for an integrated and coordinated arms production effort within NATO in the 1950s 
and 1960s did not succeed (McGlade 2001).
12. The term is used to illustrate the superpower dominance of Europe during the Cold War. 
13. The term was used less and less in the 1990s, and was definitively ‘retired’ in Sweden in 2002 (Engelbrekt 
2008, 49) 
14. See unoficial translation online (Heninen.net 2010).
15. Note that prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, CSDP was known as the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
16. Both Sweden and Finland commissioned officials studies of the implications of the Lisbon solidarity clause for 
their security and defence policy (see Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009b; Tiilikainen 2008).
17. The exceptions are Sweden, Finland, Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta.
18. All Nordic officials interviewed stressed the excellent day-to-day working relationship with their Nordic counter-
parts, but officials from NATO states noted that working with non-NATO countries does pose some challenges.
19. The goal is hampered somewhat by Denmark’s ’opt out’ from the CSDP (DIIS 2008, xi-xii).
74 OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
20. Nearly all officials interviewed stressed the positive response which Nordic defence cooperation has received in 
both NATO and EU circles.
21. The exception was 4 mechanized reserve battalions, and the Swedish Home Guard.
22. Danish forces in the Arctic do not have ‘real military’ tasks, only surveillance and sovereignty tasks (Petersen 
2009b, 58). The Icelandic Cost Guard also lacks any combat capability.
23. As illustrated by their decision to establish a common Baltic Sea maritime picture, through the Sea Surveillance 
Co-operation Finland Sweden (SUCFIS), and their work to include other Baltic Sea nations in this undertaking 
(Kaskeala 2009a, 12-13).
24. Unlike Finland, Sweden has a seaport on the North Sea, Gothenburg, which makes it slightly less reliant on the 
Baltic Sea for maritime transport.
25. None of the Norwegian defence officials interviewed mentioned such a common understanding, and some denied 
it actively when asked about it concretely.
26. Comment by a senior Norwegian official involved with the Stoltenberg report at the XIII Annual Suomenlinna 
Seminar, Finnish National Defence University, Helsinki, 2–3 June 2010.
27. All Nordic officials interviewed shared this view.
28. Most officials interviewed emphasised this issue, particularly so in Finland, where it is considered paramount.
29. Interviews with defence officials in Sweden, Norway and Finland.
30. The Patria AMV decision has been challenged legally, and in October 2009 a Swedish court ordered the Swedish 
Defence Materiel Administration to carry out a new procurement process.
31. Several Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish officials involved in the NORDSUP process stressed the need to develop 
such common standards.
32. Particularly Swedish officers involved in NORDEFCO emphasised this point, which is perhaps a legacy of the 
Cold War, when Sweden had a large indigenous arms industry which made custom-built weapons for the Swe-
dish Armed Forces (see e.g. Andersson 2007, 148–152).
33. The main exceptions are the Home Guard, the Royal Guard battalion, the Border Guard battalion and the Coast 
Guard (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 61-62).
34. The Royal Guard battalion can also be employed as a manoeuvre battalion, though not for international opera-
tions.
35. Numbers include ships currently being built.
36. Missile Torpedo Boats.
37. Numbers include aircraft still being delivered.
38. Numbers include helicopters still being delivered, and do not include light utility helicopters nor helicopters being 
phased out of service.
39. Nearly all officials interviewed in Norway, Sweden and Finland shared these views. Note however that interest for 
Nordic cooperation was generally seen as being on the rise in Copenhagen.
40. To name an example of its NATO compatibility, unlike the other Nordic states, Denmark formally has no separate 
operational level doctrine, but relies on NATO doctrine (Frantzen 2005, 169-173; Innset 2002, 3).
41. Finland is estimated to have about 1,136 artillery pieces in its inventory, which includes multiple rocket laun-
chers and 120mm heavy mortars (IISS 2010, 182)
42. Many defence officials also mentioned the language barrier as a challenge to cooperation.
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43. Ibid (see also Norwegian Armed Forces 2007). The other author was a Norwegian civilian, Kjell Inge Bjerga, 
Head of Department of Civil-Military Relations, and Fellow at Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
44. Though there are cultural differences. Also, note that the Swedish and Norwegian land forces are more similar, 
and therefore more interested in co-operation, than their navies and air forces.
45. Almost all military respondents in Norway and Sweden emphasised the possible lack of political will to make 
nationally unpopular decisions as the major future challenge for Nordic cooperation. 
46. This may be seen, in IR terminology, as a ‘relative gain’ vs. ‘absolute gain’ problem.
47. Comment by a senior Finnish defence official at the XIII Annual Suomenlinna Seminar, Finnish National Defence 
University, Helsinki, 2–3 June 2010.
48. Also, comments by senior Finnish defence officials at the XIII Annual Suomenlinna Seminar, Finnish National 
Defence University, Helsinki, 2–3 June 2010.
49. All those interviewed who agreed to speak on this issue agreed that Finland was heading for a radical shake-up of 
its force structure, but opinions varied on how soon this was likely to happen.
50. Almost all Nordic officials interviewed shared this view.
51. See also an article by the director of the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (Holmgren 2010).
52. This view was held by almost every interviewee, although some speculated that the separate NORDCAPS, 
NORDAC and NORDSUP ‘ways of doing things’ would persist in NORDEFCO.
53. Similar effects have been observed with loose intergovernmental foreign and security policy cooperation setups 
before, such as with the European Political Cooperation (1970–1993) (see Smith 2004). As for the Nordic 
states, Pernille Rieker argues that Nordic participation in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well 
as the CSDP, has gradually led to the Europeanization of their security and defence policies (Rieker 2003).
54. The term ‘functional spillover’ is associated with the neo-functionalist theory of European integration, as is, to a 
lesser extent, ‘elite socialisation’ (for a short description, see Jensen 2010, 75-77).
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